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CASE NOTES
Admiralty-Locality Rule-Federal Maritime Jurisdiction Held to Extend
to Unseaworthiness Claim of Longshoreman Injured on Pier by Shore Based
Equipment.-Plaintiff was a dockworker whose duty was to ensure that cargo
containers were loaded aboard ship in the proper sequence. The containers were
moved by carriers along the pier to the water's edge where plaintiff directed
their positioning beneath the crane which hoisted them on board. He was injured when one of the carriers ran into him. Plaintiff brought an action alleging
negligence against the ship and her owner, as well as against his employer.
Plaintiff also alleged unseaworthiness on the part of the vessel. The district
court dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction-there was neither diversity of
citizenship, nor was the injury caused by some instrumentality of the vessel so
as to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the judgment below as to the claim for unseaworthiness. The plaintiff
was "in the ship's service," and the carrier was an "appurtenance" of the ship
since the carrier and the plaintiff were integral parts of the loading process.
Admiralty jurisdiction was therfore authorized. Gebhard v. SS. Hawaiian Legislator,425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970).
The United States Constitution provides that the federal judicial power shall
extend to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." 2 Pursuant to this
provision, section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 17893 gave the federal district courts
"exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it ... ." The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 5 eliminated troublesome questions concerning jurisdiction
over maritime torts generated by vessels on navigable waters but consummated
on land. However, other questions concerning the boundaries of this ground of
federal jurisdiction have been left to the courts.6
Admiralty jurisdiction is not dependent on an amount in controversy, nor the
presence of any federal question since the substantive maritime law as applied
in admiralty is an independent ground of federal jurisdiction. 7 Jurisdiction in
admiralty over contract claims depends on the maritime nature of the services
1.
F.2d
2.
3.
4.
5.

Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 284 F. Supp. 634 (CJ). Cal. 1968), rev'd, 425
1303 (9th Cir. 1970).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1964).
Id.
46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).

6. Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d at 1307.
7. Mr. Justice Story stated in DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815), that cases of maritime jurisdiction, within the constitutional delegation, comprehend "all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries." See, e.g., Mastan Co. v. Steinberg,
418 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970); Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of
Admiralty § 1-9, at 19 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore & Black].
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to be performed regardless of where the contract was made or executed. 8 However, in the earlier cases, jurisdiction over tort claims was restricted by "locality"
-the injury had to occur upon navigable waters. 9
Exceptions to the locality rule are found in the seaman's statutory rights
under the Jones Act,10 and where the injured party possessed a maritime "status"
or "relation." The United States Supreme Court recognized in O'Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co." that because of the seaman's maritime status,
he was entitled to the traditional remedy of maintenance and cure-a limited
recovery for personal injuries-from his employer, regardless of whether the
injury occurred at sea or on land: 1 2 "[T]he admiralty jurisdiction over the suit
depends not on the place where the injury is inflicted but on the nature of the
its relationship to the operation of the vessel plying in navigable
service and
1
waters."'
Longshoreman could also recover under this status theory if they were doing
seaman's work. In InternationalStevedoring Co. v. Haverty'4 a stevedore, while

engaged in stowing freight on board a ship, was held to be a "seaman" within
the meaning of the Merchant Marine Act of 19201r (predecessor to the Jones
Act). The Supreme Court recognized that although generally "stevedores are
not 'seamen', '16 the injured party should not be restricted in his recovery because
of the title of his position. The stevedore could bring an action in negligence
against his employer under this Act since "[t]he work upon which the plaintiff
8. E.g., North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119
(1919); Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900); DeLovio v. Bolt, 7 F. Cas.
418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815); see Gilmore & Black § 1-9, at 20.
9. See The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
20 (1865); Forgione v. United States, 202 F.2d 249 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 966
(1953); Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. City of New York, 135 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1943);
The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); The Vizcaya, 38 F. Supp. 1020 (D.
Mass. 1941).
10. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) grants to seamen a cause of action for injuries due to the
negligence of their employers or fellow employees. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). See also Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262 (1966) (per
curiam). This Act has been interpreted liberally by the courts so that a longshoreman
having the status of a seaman could recover under it. See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text. However, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-50 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970), prevented the longshoreman from asserting
these rights against his employer. See notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text.
11. 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
12. For jurisdictional purposes piers were considered extensions of the land. Swanson v.
Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
13. 318 U.S. at 42-43.
14. 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
15. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, codified as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1964), gave to "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment . . . an action for damages at law . . . and in such action all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy .. . shall apply . . .
16. 272 U.S. at 52.
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was engaged was a maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's crew."'17
There are limitations, however, on the maritime rights of harbor workers with
respect to their employers. In Swanson v. MarraBrothers, Inc.'8 a longshoreman
was prevented by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act' 9 from suing his employer. The compensation statute, which was enacted
subsequent to the decision in Haverty, provides that recovery of a compensation
award is the exclusive remedy against the harbor worker's employer.20 This
exclusivity provision, however, does not affect the longshoreman's right, under
the traditional maritime law of unseaworthiness, to recover from the shipowner
for injuries on the ship. Unseaworthiness, a form of strict liability of shipowners,
was strictly limited to seamen, i.e., "men who go to sea," until well into the
present century.2 ' Today however, this doctrine has become the principal
vehicle for personal injury recovery even for those persons not strictly classified
as "seanen."22
The right to recover damages for breach of duty to furnish a seaworthy
vessel was first stated in The Osceola23 where it was recognized that both the
ship and its owner were "liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen
in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and
keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship."24 The warranty of
seaworthiness was not implied as a term in the seamen's contract of employment,
rather it was implied because it was "just to import it into the legal relations
arising out of the service itself .... M5
17. Id. (citation omitted). See also Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 239 (1931);
Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1914).
18.

328 U.S. 1 (1946).

19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970). It should be noted that
jurisdiction under this statute depends upon the locality test in that the injury must have
occured upon navigable waters (including dry docks). Id. § 903; see Nacirema Operating
Co. v. Johnson, 396 US. 212 (1969), noted in 38 Fordham L. Rev. 545 (1970).
20. "The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability ... Y"33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).

21. Gilmore & Black § 6-53, at 358.
22. Id. § 6-38, at 315, see, e.g., Horn v. Cia de Navegacion Fruco, S.A., 404 F2d 422 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969) ; Gibbs v. Kiesel, 382 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1967) ;
In re Marine Sulphur Transp. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Murphy v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1246 (EMD. Pa. 1970). But see McDaniel v. The M/S
Lisholt, 282 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (warranty of -eaworthiness held not to extend to fireman who was on board the vessel and who had knowledge of the condition); Talton v. United States Lines Co., 203 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (no duty breached as to a passenger). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 505 (1966);
Grundman, Unseaworthiness and Personal Injuries Ashore, 17 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 481
(1968); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Cornell
L.Q. 381 (1954); 24 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 114 (1967).
23. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).

24. Id. at 175 (citation omitted).
25. Sthika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F2d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951). The scope of the warranty of seaworthiness was broadened in
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The Supreme Court held that the
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It was not until 1946, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,20 that a longshoreman,
injured while on board a ship, recovered from the shipowner for unseaworthiness.
Swanson, which precluded the stevedore from suing his employer directly, was
distinguished because the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act only released employers from liability, while not affecting liabilities of other
persons. 27 The Court in Sieracki, like the Court in The Osceola, did not rationalize the existence of liability on the basis of a contract between the longshoreman
and the shipowner 28 but rather because of "the hazards of marine service which
unseaworthiness places on the men who perform it." 29 The inability of the longshoreman to protect himself against these hazards combined with the severity
of his having to bear the injury and financial loss justified placing liability on
the sbipowner,30 who is not only in the position to avoid negligent injuries, but
can also distribute the loss throughout the industry "which receives the service
and should bear its cost." 3'
To justify the shipowner's liability the Court said that since historically the
work of loading and unloading a ship was done by the ship's crew,3 2 the owner
should not be free to negate his liability by parcelling such work out to other
employees. 33 Although the shipowner is at liberty to secure the benefits of
specialization to conduct his
business, he should not be at liberty to delegate his
34
traditional responsibilities.
employer's duty to furnish his employees with a seaworthy ship was non-delegable and
not qualified by the fellow-servant rule. As a result of the decision in Mahnich, negligence
on the part of the crew would not be fatal to the seaman's claim if he could find "some
handhold of unseaworthiness to cling to." Gilmore & Black § 6-39, at 320.
26. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). This case clearly illustrated the strict liability which the
warranty of seaworthiness imposed. A shackle supporting a boom was found to have been
forged defectively. The Court found that even though there was no duty to test the shackle
on the part of the shipowner and the manufacturer was negligent in this duty, the owner's
warranty of seaworthiness made him not jointly but severally liable. Id. at 89.
27. "Congress by that Act not only did not purport to make the stevedore's remedy for
compensation against his employer exclusive of remedies against others. It expressly reserved
to the stevedore a right of election to proceed against third persons responsible for his
injury . .. ." Id. at 101 (footnote omitted).
28. The shipowner argued that the warranty of seaworthiness arose because of the contract relation between shipowner and seamen. The Court stated that: "[T]he norm of the
liability has been historically and still is the case of the seaman under contract with the
vessel's owner. This is because the work of maritime service has been done largely by such
persons. But it does not follow necessarily from this fact that the liability either arose exclusively from the existence of a contractual relation or is confined to situations in which
one exists." Id. at 90.
29. Id. at 93.
30. Id. at 93-94.
31. Id. at 94.
32. Id. at 96; see The Seguranca, 58 F. 908, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1893); The Gilbert Knapp,
37 F. 209, 210 (E.D. Wis. 1889).
33. "Not the owner's consent to liability, but his consent to performance of the service
defines its boundary." 328 US. at 96.
34. Id.

19711

CASE NOTES

Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic35 was relied upon by the majority in

Gebhard, and is important for its application of seaworthiness to a shoreside
injury. Judge Learned Hand concluded in Strika that admiralty jurisdiction existed over the unseaworthiness claim of a longshoreman injured on a pier because
of defective ship's tackle. 36 Relying upon O'Donnell and Swanson, the court
said: "[S]uch a tort, arising as it does out of a maritime 'status' or 'relation', is
cognizable by the maritime law whether it arises on sea or on land." 37 Thus, the
court held that: "[I]f a seaman can [recover], we see no reason to question the
ability of a longshoreman also to recover, for that follows from the reasoning

of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki ...especially when it is read with the opinion
in Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc ....
The court in Gebkard v. SS. Hawaiian Legislator"0 held that admiralty
jurisdiction would exist regardless of the locality of the injury when the basic
requirements of the tort of unseaworthiness were pleaded: First, the petitioner's
work must have been "in the ship's service" so that the warranty of seaworthi-

ness extended to him; second, the equipment must have been a part of the
"ship's equipment or an appurtenant appliance;" third, he must have been

injured by a piece of equipment not reasonably fit for its intended use.04 It is
in the court's treatment of these elements that Gebkard is important in the trend
to expand recovery for unseaworthiness. 41
The plaintiff's problem in proving he was in the ship's service, the first element
of the tort, was that he was further removed from the actual loading-unloading
operation than those injured in prior cases.42 His duty as a maritime clerk was
35. 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
36. Id. at 558.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citations omitted). Judge Hand thought that although the plaintiff also had
admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, it was
not necessary to rely upon it to support this type of recovery. Id. The Supreme Court
utilized the same reasoning as the Strika Court in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S.
406 (1953). Legal protection was given to a shore based carpenter based "on the type of
work he did. ... His need for protection from unseaworthiness was neither more nor less
than that of the stevedores then working with him on the ship or of seamen ....All were
entitled to like treatment under law." Id. at 413.
39. 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970). As in Strika, the court in Gebhard stated that admiralty jurisdiction need not be predicated on the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act.
Id. at 1307.
40. Id. at 1310.
41. Gebhard's claim failed in the district court because it found that he did not meet two
of the basic requisites for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness: his work was not in
the ship's service and the equipment that injured him was not a part of the ship's equipment
or appurtenant appliance. Gebhard v. SS. Hawaiian Legislator, 284 F. Supp. 634, 639-40
(C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970). Because these elements of the tort
were not met, the case was dismissed for want of admiralty jurisdiction, and the third
element, fitness for use, was not decided. Id. at 638-40.
42. E.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (longshoreman injured
on pier while unloading ship); Strika v. Netherlands ,Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.d 5S5 (2d
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
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to aid in the preparation for loading by directing the straddle carrier drivers to
position the cargo vans in proper sequence under the ship's crane. The district
court held that "his duties were not 'the "type of work" traditionally done by
seamen. "48
The court of appeals approached this problem by noting that the "'duty to
provide a seaworthy ship and gear ... applies to longshoremen unloading the ship
whether they are standing aboard ship or on the pier.' "44 The majority thought
that the test to be applied was "status--being involved in the ship's service-not
location. 45 As long as the longshoreman is an "integral part of the loading
... in the ship's service," and thus has a cause of
process" 46 he is "prima facie
47
action for unseaworthiness.
This status, or relation theory, allowed the court to view broadly the second
element of the tort, that the injury was caused by a piece of the ship's equipment
or an appurtenant appliance. 48 Gebhard was allegedly injured because of defects
in shore-based equipment 4 9 The district court had held that in the loading operation, "the doctrine of unseaworthiness extends only to equipment which is
actually used to load on or into the vessel or unload from the vessel itself."50
Again the court of appeals took a broader view of the loading process, so that
the equipment used to get cargo in position to be loaded, since necessary to this
process, was considered an appurtenance.51
43. 284 F. Supp. at 639.
44. 425 F.2d at 1311, quoting Gutierrez v. Waterman, 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963).
Gutierrez involved the unloading of leaky bean bags which caused a longshoreman to slip
on the pier, resulting in his injury. The court, relying heavily upon the logic of Strika and
Sieracki, held that the shipowner becomes strictly liable for injuries caused by cargo
accepted in faulty containers.
45. 425 F.2d at 1310. In prior cases the courts adhered to the locality requirement, forcing
themselves to "construct metaphysical links with the ship. Not surprisingly, different circuits
have clashing styles of shipbuilding." Comment, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75
Yale LJ. 1174, 1189 (1966). For examples of the confusion in the courts regarding this
problem, see Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965);
Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943
(1965); Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963); Fredericks v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956); McKnight
v. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd., 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
46. 425 F.2d at 1311; see Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964), where a longshoreman was thrown from a freight car in the
process of bringing cargo to the ship's side.
47. 425 F.2d at 1312. In fact, it has been held that "[tlhe work of loading and unloading
the ship is, as a matter of law, the work of the ship's service, performed until recent times
by members of the crew." Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964) (citation omitted).
48. 425 F.2d at 1312.
49. Gebhard was struck from behind by the straddle carrier, allegedly because neither It
nor the pier had lights, and the carriers were designed so that the driver's view of pedestrains
was blocked. Id. at 1305.
50. 284 F. Supp. at 640.
51. 425 F.2d at 1312. On this point there is considerable authority that shore based
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The court in Gebhard felt justified in providing the warranty of seaworthiness
to longshoremen, for " [a] longshoreman's duties bring him into a zone of danger
unique to maritime commerce... and his injury, when incurred in the ship's
service by ship's equipment, is an appropriate subject of maritime jurisdiction."52
Since Gebhard's claim satisfied the first two necessary requirements, the court
concluded that admiralty jurisdiction existed. 53 The district court's dismissal was
thus reversed and remanded for trial on the question of the third requirementwhether the equipment was reasonably fit for its intended use."
The trend toward granting maritime jurisdiction and allowing the longshore-

man to recover from the shipowner has introduced complications. The shipowner
is usually entitled to indemnification from the longshoreman's employer as a
result of the contract between them.5 5 This has caused liability to be shifted back
to the longshoreman's employer, one whom the injured person could not sue
directly because of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act.56 The court of appeals felt that this result has not been unfortunate, for
it is logical to have those responsible for the injury bear the liability, not only
because they were at fault, but because of the incentive this would provide to
eliminate the risk of harm.57 The low scale of benefits to which longshoremen
equipment is appurtenant to the ship as a necessary and integral part of the loading-unloading
process, and many courts have found an appurtenance to be anything adopted by the ship
to perform its service. E.g., Petterson v. Alaska S5. Co., 205 F.d 478 (9th Cir. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Casbon v. Stockard SS. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 845
(E.D. La. 1959). See also Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963). However there is a sharp
conflict of authority in the lower federal courts as to this point. Compare Spann v. Lauritzen,
344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 938 (1955) (shore based hopper furnished
by the stevedore company was appurtenance of ship), with Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co.,
323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963) (conveyer on pier not appurtenance until connected with ship),
and Sherbin v. S.G. Embiricos, Lta., 200 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1962) (grain distributor
owned by stevedore company and used in ship's hold not an appurtenance).
52. 425 F.2d at 1310 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 1311-12.
54. Id.
55. Eg., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 324-25 (1964); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic SS. Corp., 350 US. 124 (1956);
see Comment, supra note 45, at 1184.
56. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
57. 425 F.2d at 1312; see Proudfoot, "The Tar Baby": Maritime Personal-Injury
Indemnity Actions, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 423 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Proudfoot]. Proudfoot
pointed out that absent indemnity actions, when the plaintiff recovered against the shipowner,
the compensation carrier of the stevedore company could recoup its payments made under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act from the judgment. Thus the incentive was
removed from the stevedore to take even ordinary care. Even with indemnity actions there
will be many instances where the shipowners alone will be liable. Eg., Waterman S-S. Corp.
v. David, 353 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966); Reddick
v. McAllister Lighterage Line Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958);
Ignatyuk v. Tramp Chartering Corp., 250 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1957); Hagans v. Farrell Lines,
Inc., 237 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1956); see Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co,
355 US. 563 (1958); cf. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
376 US. 315 (1964); DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962).
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are entitled under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act,
has been an additional underlying reason for the courts to reach this result.58
The judicial extension of admiralty jurisdiction over unseaworthiness claims
of longshoremen has been criticized as an unwarranted encroachment into the
legislative area.50 The dissent in Gebhard called the maritime status theory a
"novel doctrine" and a theory without authority, and said that maritime jurisdiction should be limited to the rules set by Congress in the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, for there was "no compelling reason of social policy to
justify the majority's departure from settled jurisdictional rules." 00 The use of
the ship as a "conduit" to circumvent the limited recovery under the federal
compensation act has also been criticized. 01 "If the benefits under the Compensation Act are inadequate, the remedy lies in action by Congress, not in judicial
"62
legerdemain ....
Since it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will abandon its decisions expanding the scope of the warranty of seaworthiness,0 3 Congress should introduce
consistency and rationality into the area. An increase in benefits under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act would encourage an
injured employee to seek his remedy there and thus eliminate, in many cases, the
circuity of actions which now exists. The courts have recognized the desirability
of expanded recovery but in justifying that recovery have relied on fictions0" in
trying to find some connection between the injured party and the ship.05 By
doing this they "have made seaworthiness a confused and unconvincing
doctrine."00
Gebhard is important not only in its broad application of the warranty of sea58. See Note, The Warranty of Seaworthiness: An Appraisal of Longshoremen's Remedies
for On-the-Job Injuries, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 331, 338 (1967).
59. See Alaska S.S. Co., Inc. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 401-02 (1954)

(Burton, J.,

dissenting); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 105-06 (1946) (Stone, CJ., dissenting); Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legisator, 425 F.2d 1313, 1306-17 (9th Cir. 1970) (Wright J.,
dissenting in part). This view is based upon the premise that Congress can extend admiralty
jurisdiction, but "from this congressional power . . .it does not follow that a court ...
can or should depart from well-settled rules and expand its jurisdiction to the very brink of
the constitutional limits." Id. at 1316.
60. 425 F.2d at 1317.
61. See, e.g., Judge Friendly's dissent in Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539,
544 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967).
62. Id.
63. See Proudfoot 445.
64. It is ironic that although the historical test is used to justify giving the remedy to
longshoremen, since they are performing work traditionally done by seamen, there have been
few cases where a crew member has been hurt while handling cargo. Shields & Byrne,
Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1137,
1139-47 (1963). "The courts have either misread, or have not read, the facts of history."
Id. at 1152.
65. Comment, supra note 45, at 1189-90.
66. Id. at 1190.
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worthiness to those within the "zone of danger unique to maritime commerce," 07
but in its recognition of the reasonableness of this application and of its effects:
the shipowner cannot isolate himself from liability, the longshoreman gets the
recovery he deserves, and, as the facts warrant, liability will be placed on the
party that should be responsible. The court took jurisdiction based upon judicial
precedent, without being restricted by the locality rule and Congressional inaction, and in this way furthered the philosophy of Justice Rutledge in Sieracki
that seaworthiness "is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of
its humanitarian policy."68

Class Actions-Identical Violations of the Retail Instalment Sales Act Held
Not to Create a "Common Question" within the Meaning of the New
York Class Action Statute.-Plaintiffs, in seperate transactions, purchased

carpeting from New York City merchants. They signed retail installment sales
contracts which defendant, a sales finance company, had supplied to the mer-

chants. Defendant then acquired the contracts from merchants immediately
after consummation of the sales. These contracts violated section 1 of the Retail
Instalment Sales Act 1 since significant portions were printed in less than eight
point type.2 Plaintiffs sought to bring a class action to recover the statutory
penalty3 on behalf of themselves and all others who had signed these form
contracts. The trial court dismissed the complaint 4 and the appellate division
affirmed.5 On appeal, a unanimous court of appeals affirmed and refused to allow
67. 425 F.2d at 1310. It was the concept that stevedoring was an extra-hazardous activity
that prompted federal judges to find avenues of recovery beyond those provided by thL
federal compensation act. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 93-96 (1946); Shields
& Byrne, supra note 64, at 1152; see Note, The Warranty of Seaworthiness: An Appraisal of
Longshoremen's Remedies for On-the-job Injuries, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 331, 343-44 (1967),
for a discussion of extending the warranty of seaworthiness not on the basis of the status
and historical tests but on the basis of strict liability for extrahazardous activities. See also
Comment, supra note 45, at 1189-90, where it is said that the most rational approach would
be to limit recovery to high-risk employees within the ship-dock area.
68. 328 U.S. at 95.
1. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 402-14 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
2. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(1) (McKinney 1962) reads: "A retail instalment contract
or obligation shall be dated and in writing; the printed portion thereof shall be in at least
eight point type."
3. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(2) (McKinney 1962) provides: "In case of failure by
any person to comply with the provisions of this article, the buyer shall have the right to
recover from such person an amount equal to the credit service charge or service charge
imposed and the amount of any delinquency, collection, extension, deferral or refinance
charge imposed."
4. See Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1970).
5. Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 31 App. Div. 2d 892, 298 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1st Dept.
1969), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
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the plaintiffs to bring a class action holding that the statutory prerequisite of
the existence of a common question was not satisfied. Hall v. Coburn Corp. ol
America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
At common law, if there was a possibility of individual litigation by numerous
parties and the claim of these parties included a question of law or fact common
to all, a court of equity would grant a bill of peace.0 Thus, if the lord and his
tenants had a dispute about some feudal duty which the lord claimed was due
and the tenants resisted, the lord could ask for a bill of peace. 7 Since there
would be a common question involved in each of the potential actions (i.e.,
whether the tenants did or did not owe the particular duty to the lord), equity
could take jurisdiction. The lord, then, would not have to sue each tenant individually and the courts would not be required to hear several cases involving
the same questions between similarly situated parties.8
As equity's scope broadened, the concept of the bill of peace also broadened.
In Mayor of York v. Pilkington,9 the City of York claimed exclusive fishing
rights in the Ouse River. However, several lords who owned riparian land also
claimed the right to fish therein. Although the lords' potential rights arose from
different deeds, the court allowed the Mayor to maintain a suit against all the
lords, finding the situation analogous to that where a bill of peace would be
allowed.' 0
The Supreme Court of the United States also followed this early recognition
of the right to bring class actions. Thus, in Smith v. Swormstedt,11 an action
was allowed on behalf of the widows and orphans of the Methodist Episcopal
Church (Southern) as well as on behalf of retired ministers, to recover the
proceeds of a business enterprise which had been established to provide income
for them, but which had been appropriated by northern ministers when the
church split into northern and southern factions. Justice Nelson, discussing the
general rule that parties may sue only in their own behalf, noted cases in which
an exception had been made:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one or more sue or
defend for the benefit of the whole.... Where the parties are very numerous and
though they have or may have separate
and distinct interests, yet it is impracticable to
12
bring them all before the court.
6. See 1 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 246, at 467-68 (Sth ed. 1941).
7. See, e.g., Cowper v. Clerk, 24 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ch. 1732).
8. Id.
9. 25 Eng. Rep. 946 (Ch. 1737).
10. Similarly, in Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, L.R. 2 Ch. 8 (1866), a reservoir
burst causing great damage. A commission was appointed to examine the damage and issue
certificates to those whose property had been harmed. The injured parties could then sue

Sheffield for the amount stated in the certificates. Sheffield claimed that several thousand
fraudulent certificates had been issued and brought suit against some of the allegedly
fraudulent certificate holders as representatives of all the fraudulent certificate holders.
Equity allowed the suit because there was a common question-whether the certificates were
validly issued---even though the certificate holders had no other common interest or defense.
11. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
12. Id. at 302.
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In New-York & New Haven Railroad v. Schuyler,' 3 New York also recognized the broad use of class actions. Schuyler, as director of the railroad, had
issued two million dollars worth of fraudulent stock. The railroad was allowed
to sue, not in its own behalf, but on behalf of all the legitimate stockholders.
Furthermore, the suit was against Schuyler, not in his individual capacity, but
as representative of all the holders of fraudulently issued stock. The court
found that "convenience and the ends of justice"' 4 required that a single action
be brought, and thus allowed the class action.
The state of the law in 1890, then, was best summarized by Judge Harlan in
Osborne v. Wisconsin Central Railroad.'5 This case involved a dispute between
the railroad and some homesteaders each of whom claimed a particular tract
of land under different acts of Congress. The railroad had brought three unsuccessful ejectment actions against individual homesteaders. Osborne, suing on
behalf of himself and all other homesteaders claiming title to the land, sued to
enjoin the railroad from bringing further ejectment actions. The court noted:
The case is peculiarly one in which the jurisdiction of a court of equity may be
invoked in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits. It belongs to the class "where a
number of persons have separate and individual claims and rights of action against the
same party, but all arise from some common cause, are governed by the same legal
rule, and involve similar facts, and the whole matter might be settled in a single suit
brought by all these persons uniting as co-plaintiffs, or one of the persons suing on
behalf of the others .... " In such cases the plaintiffs are united by a common tie,
created by identity of interest in the decision of the same questions of law and of
fact, and have a common adversary.' 6
Thus it seemed that if there were numerous potential litigants all of whom
shared an interest in a common question of law or fact a class action suit would
be proper.
However, in 1892, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Tribbette v. Illinois
Central Railroad,'7 injected confusion into an otherwise clear doctrine. Sparks
from a train operated by the defendant railroad started a fire and a number of
those whose property was damaged by the fire tried to sue the railroad in a
single negligence action. The court, in disallowing the suit, said that although
there were common questions of law and fact, there was no other community
of interest between the potential plaintiffs. The court suggested that something
akin to privity between the various plaintiffs would be required in order to
sustain the class suit.' 8 While the decision has been criticized,'0 Tribbette, with
13. 17 N.Y. 592 (1858).
14. Id. at 606.
15. 43 F. 824 (W.D. Wis. 1890).
16. Id. at 827 (citations omitted).
17. 70 M1iss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1892).
18. Id. at 184, 12 So. at 33.
19. See, e.g., Bailey v. Tillinghast, 99 F. 801 (6th Cir. 1900) where court stated:
"Nor is it necessary . . . that there should be any privity of interest ....
It is true there
are occasional cases where it seems to have been supposed that there must be some community of interest-some tie between the individuals who make up the great number; but the
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its misconception of history and purpose of class actions, has had an effect. The
notion of privity between the numerous litigants had been introduced, and its
influence can be seen in the confusion which currently surrounds class actions
in New York.
New York, in an amendment to the Field Code of 1848,20 was the first state
to recognize class actions by statute. New York, however, has vaccilated over
the use of its class action statute. The statute, which has remained unchanged
since the Field Code, reads:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons or where
the persons who might be made parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
21
benefit of all.

While virtually ignoring the provision which allows a class action to be
brought where "the persons who might be made parties are very numerous and

22
the courts have
it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court,"

focused on the "common or general interest" requirement. In the course of this
interpretation, two distinct lines of cases have developed.
The first line of cases is best exemplified by Society Milion Athena, Inc. v.
great weight of authority is to the contrary . . . And, indeed, it is difficult to find any
reason why it should be thought necessary." Id. at 806-07 (citations omitted).
20. Law of April 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 119 [1849) N.Y. Laws 72d Sess. 639 (repealed 1877).
Subsequently, several other states and the federal government enacted statutes or rules to
provide for class actions. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 382 (West 1954) ; Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 13.170 (1969); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 260.12 (1957); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The federal rule
requires the court to determine as early as possible whether an action brought as a class
action may be maintained. Such a determination can be made conditional on improvement
of representation by the intervention of additional parties. The Rules also require the best
notice possible to be given to the members of the class. In recent years there has been a
trend toward allowing broad use of these class action statutes. For example, the federal
courts have allowed a class action on behalf of almost four million purchasers of stock In
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). California, which has a class
action statute identical to that of New York, Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 382 (West 1954), has
also interpreted its statute widely. In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d
732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967), a suit was allowed on behalf of all those who had purchased
coupon books from a particular cab company, despite the fact that different sales to unrelated persons for disparate services were involved. For other examples of this broad use
of class action statutes, see, e.g., City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1959) ; Robnet
v. Miller, 105 Ohio 536, 152 N.E2d 763 (1957); Peters v. International Harvester Co., 248
Wis. 451, 22 N.W.2d 518 (1946).

21. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1005(a) (McKinney 1963).
22. Id. Although the statute reads in the alternative, the courts have consistently held
that there must be both a question of common or general interest and a multitude of parties
to justify a class action. The fact that there are large numbers of persons who might be made
parties is not, in and of itself, sufficient for a class action. Thus in Society Milton Athena,
Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939), the court said:
"Laudable desire to avoid multiplicity of actions by persons who have suffered wrong is
insufficient unless those who would bring such actions are in some manner united in interest."
Id. at 294, 22 N.E.2d at 377.
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National Bank of Greece.P There, depositors had delivered money to the joint
offices of two banks, one of which was a foreign bank, the other a domestic
bonding corporation.
Plaintiffs contended that the receipt of money by the foreign bank had been
in violation of its license and that the domestic bank had been set up to mask
this fraudulent activity by the foreign bank. The crux of plaintiffs' argument
was that all had been harmed in the same way pursuant to this fraudulent
scheme and that a class action was, therefore, appropriate. The court of appeals4
rejected this contention, finding that "[s]eparate wrongs to separate persons"'
even though perpetrated by identical means do not in themselves create a
"common or general interest."
Thus, although there was a common question, i.e., whether the defendant had
violated the banking laws by setting up a domestic bank to mask the activities
of its foreign counterpart, the court found that something more was required.
Although "privity" was not mentioned, the court's emphasis on the fact that
separate wrongs had been done, thus destroying a "common interest," suggests
that the court felt that there must be some relation binding the members of the
putative class. In effect, the "common or general interest"
requirement was
25
raised to the level of a "unity of interest" requirement.
This position was reiterated in the recent case of Onofrio v. Playboy Club,
Inc*.2 The plaintiffs had each paid twenty-five dollars to join a private club.
The club was subsequently opened as a public, not a private facility. The
plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of the fifty thousand persons who had
paid to join this private club, alleging that the payments had been fraudulently
induced. The appellate division allowed the class action.2 7 The court of appeals
reversed, 28 adopting the dissenting opinion in the appellate division which, in
language similar to that used in Society Milion, stated that "[tIhere must be
a union or community of interest to warrant a representative action.1'*
23. 281 N.Y. 282, 22 NXE.2d 374 (1939). Other cases following the Society Milion reasoning include Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965);

Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
24. 281 N.Y. at 292, 22 N.E.2d at 377.
25. The court stated that "[ejach person wronged may determine for himself the remedy
which he will seek... " 281 N.Y. at 292, 22 N.E.2d at 377. The court also considered that
the defendant might have separate defenses against the potential plaintiffs. Id. This concern
with alternative remedies and varying defenses occurs throughout the court's consideration
of class action cases. See, e.g., Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256
N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965); Society Mdillon Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y.
282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939); Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d
890 (1937).
26. 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1965), rev'g 20 App. Div. 2d 3,
244 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1st Dep't 1963).
27. The appellate division had noted: "The members of the class are extremely numerous,
the stake of each small, the expenses of conventional, individual litigation out of all proportion to such a stake, the issues to be litigated are common, the relief available uniform." 20
App. Div. 2d at 6, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
28. 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.YS.2d 171 (1965).
29. 20 App. Div. 2d at 7, 244 N.YS.2d at 489. The appellate division dissent had stated:
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The second, more expansive line of decisions, is exemplified by Guffanti v.
National Surety Co.30 The plaintiff brought suit against a bonded merchant who
had received funds for transmittal abroad, had converted the money, and was
then adjudged a bankrupt. The members of the putative class had executed
similar contracts with the defendant and while the amounts due were different,
the terms and conditions of the contracts were similar. The court sustained a
class action noting that:
[T]he weight of authority is simply overwhelming that the jurisdiction may and should
be exercised ...on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants against a single
party .. .although there is no 'common title' nor 'community of rights,' or of
'interest in the subject-matter' among these individuals, but where there is and because
there is merely a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact
involved in the general controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and
obtained by or against each individual member of the numerous body . .

. Courts

of the highest standing and ability have repeatedly interfered and exercised this
jurisdiction, where the individual claims were not only legally separate, but were
separate in time, and each arose from an entirely separate and distinct transaction,
simply because there was a community of interest among all the claimants in the
question at issue and in the remedy. 8'
82
This approach was reaffirmed in Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
The plaintiff brought an action for an injunction, declaratory relief and an
accounting against the gas company, alleging that a service charge which the
company proposed to levy was illegal. The court refused to allow the class action
for an accounting since Kovarsky had never paid the charge, 8 but allowed a
class action for declaratory and injunctive relief finding that Kovarsky, as a
('consumer" of gas was representative of all such consumers and that "[a]ll
consumers are interested in a declaration of the law."8 4 Thus, in the words of
Guffanti, there was a "community of interest among them in the questions of

"The first question must be whether the issue is one of common or general interest to all
persons who became members so as to empower plaintiffs to act in their behalf without
express authorization. There must be a union or community of interest to warrant a
representative action." Id. This is the most overt expression to be found in any of the cases
that there must be something more than a common question and multiple parties to justify
a class action. But, it is unclear from this opinion whether the dissent intended there must
be both an "issue of common or general interest" and a "community of interests" or whether
an "issue of common or general interest" is the same as a "community of interests." Since
the court of appeals adopted the dissenting opinion as its own, it is difficult to determine
what they thought the dissenter meant.
30. 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909). Also typical of this line of cases are Case v.
Indian Motorcycle Co., 300 N.Y. 513, 89 N.E.2d 246 (1949); Tyndall v. Pinelawn Cemetery,
198 N.Y. 217, 91 N.E. 591 (1910) (per curiam); Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N.Y. 137 (1878).
31. 196 N.Y. at 458, 90 N.E. at 176.
32. 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
33. In dictum, the court stated that even if the plaintiff had a cause of action for an
accounting, a class action for accounting would have been improper. Id. at 314, 18 N.E.2d
at 290.
34. Id. at 315, 18 N.E.2d at 291.
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law and fact involved in the general controversy"3 5 and a class action suit was
proper.
These two lines of cases seemed to be resolved in Lichtyger v. Franchard
Corp.3 6 This was an action by the limited partners in a real estate syndicate
against the general partners. Alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs sued
for recission of several purportedly harmful contracts, and for damages. While
refusing to allow a class action for recission, the court found that a class action
for damages was appropriate 3 7 Relying on such earlier decisions as Kovarsky,
the court in Lichtyger stated that its decision did not conflict with decisions
such as Society Milion.3 8 The court found that the plaintiff's mutual interest
in the rate of return on their investment was enough to create a question of
"common interest" in the members of the putative class. The court, then, was
possibly reaffirming the line of cases which held that the "common interest"
basis for a class action must be in the wrong alleged, not necessarily in any
intra group relationship 3 9 This conclusion is bolstered by another statement of
Lichtyger court that: "It is clear, then, that, if the fixed rental [was] wrongfully
impaired, all of the limited partners would be injured in the same way and the
matter would be of 'common or general interest' to them.1 40 Thus, it is not
the interest that the members of the class may have in one another that is
important, it is their interest in the way they are being injured. If all are injured
in the same way, their interest is "common." They are a class because they
suffer a common wrong at the hands of the same wrongdoer.
However, any hope that Lichtyger might have resolved the problem as to
what constitutes a common question, was dispelled by Hall. While admitting
that "[t]here is some inconsistency in the cases in this court," Judge Bergan
found that "an overall appraisal of them would suggest that a basis for class
action is not stated in these complaints." 41 He then cited Society Milion and
Onofrio to support his decision.42 Judge Bergan then discussed Kovarsky briefly
and concluded that "whatever might be said of that common interest the
tendency of the cases which followed [chronologically] Kovarsky is to restrict,
rather than enlarge, the scope of class actions." 43
In discussing the line of cases which do seem to utilize a broader basis for
class actions, the court continued: "The real sanction accorded by this court
to class suits has been in the closely associated relationships growing out of
35. 196 N.Y. at 458, 90 N.E. at 176.
36. 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
37. The Lichtyger court, however, affirmed the appellate division's dismissal because the
plaintiffs had asked for equitable relief to which they were not entitled. Id. at S37, 223
N.E.2d at 874, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
38. Id. at 534-35, 223 N.E.2d at 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 382-3.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 534, 223 N.E.2d at 872, 277 N.YS.2d at 381-82.
41. 26 N.Y.2d at 401, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311 N.YS.2d at 283.
42. judge Bergan also cited Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 1S N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256
N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965), and Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E2d 890
(1937). These cases all adopt a restrictive interpretation of the class action statute.
43. 26 N.Y.2d at 402, 259 N.E.2d at 722, 311 N.YS.2d at 284 (citation omitted).
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trust, partnership or joint venture, and ownership of corporate stock (see, e.g.,
Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp ....)."44 Thus, it seems that the court has returned
to the requirement of some "community of interest" among the potential plaintiffs. It is not enough that they have all been wronged in an identical manner
by a common wrongdoer.
The court added, however, another reason for its refusal to allow the class
action: its finding that the plaintiff's claim was insignificant. The court described
defendant's contract violations as a "technicality"'45and stated that this technicality "does not reach the base of the problem.
The real injustice, of course, is the fact the poor have to pay more for carpets and
for everything else they buy on credit than people who are able to pay outright.
The small type of which plaintiffs complain was not concerned with the terms of the
contract of the sale itself. In large part it dealt with the remedies by repossession and
recovery if the purchaser did not pay for the goods.
If the type were as large as the printer's font affords it would not make the
slightest difference in the execution of these costly contracts by people who need goods
but are unable to pay for them. The essential thing for a purchaser to be able to see
in this contract is the exact amounts which make up the price and what has to be paid.40
The court's decision, then, is unfortunate in two ways. Rather than clarifying
the issue as to what constitutes a "common question" the court emphasized the
elements in Hall which negated the existence of such a question:
[A] number of persons made a number of quite different and unrelated contracts with
a number of different and unrelated sellers using the same written form which is
claimed to be illegal. This does not become a common question because the same
finance company is47the assignee of the contracts and prepared them for use by the
contracting parties.
Yet, clearly, there were "common questions." Did defendant print the contracts
which each of the plaintiffs signed? Are portions of these contracts in less than
eight point type? If the answer to both of these questions is "yes" then each
person who signed one of the contracts was entitled to the same statutory
relief. 48 Yet, the court suggested that there were no common questions whatsoever, and further, that there were alternative remedies. 49 The existence of
alternative remedies, however, does not negate the fact that all plaintiffs were
entitled to the statutory remedy.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 403, 259 N.E.2d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
46. Id. at 402-03, 259 N.E.2d at 722-23, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 284-85.
47. Id. at 400, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 282-83.
48. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414 (McKinney 1962).
49. 26 N.Y.2d at 403-04, 259 N.E.2d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d 285-86. The court noted that
the violation of the eight point type requirement was a misdemeanor and that the Attorney
General could prosecute the defendant. Also, the Banking Department could force the
defendant to change its forms to comply with the statutory requirements. Id. at 404, 259
N.E.2d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
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By emphasizing the negative, moreover, the court failed to deal with the real
issue, i.e., what does constitute a "common question." On its face Lichtyger
appeared to suggest that the occurrence of a common wrong might be sufficent
to create a question of "common or general interest." Hall suggested that the
occurrence of a common wrong was enough only when the plaintiffs were already
united in interest. Thus, while not overruling the language of Lichlyger, the
court dearly emasculated its import.
Finally, by relying so heavily in its opinion on the relative merits of plaintiff's claim, the court has created a dilemma for consumer advocates. Should one
attempt to bring a class action only when he is sure that the courts will be so
outraged by defendant's conduct that a suit will be allowed because some "public
good can be accomplished"? 5 0
Moreover, it is inappropriate for a court to describe as a mere "technicality"
that which the legislature has determined to be a crime.5 1 The statute involved
is clear on its face: all provisions of the contract must be in eight point type.
Thus, by ignoring the common law history of class actions and confusing the
language of the class action statute, the court of appeals has effectively allowed
the creation of a right without a remedy. If the provisions of the Retail Instalment Sales Act are unenforceable because of the expenses involved in litigation,
they are really mere shadow without substance5 2 As the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York has pointed out: "The results breed disrespect
for law. . . . Action is urgently necessary . . . ."3 But action, unfortunately,
has not been taken.

Criminal Procedure-Guilty Plea Valid Even When Accompanied by Profession of Innocence.-Defendant was indicted in North Carolina for first
degree murder, a capital offense in that state.' Upon consultation with counsel
and after bargaining with the prosecuting attorney, the defendant decided that
it would be beneficial to plead guilty to the lesser charge of second degree murder.2 Although defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser charge, he steadfastly
50. Id at 403, 259 N.E.2d at 722, 311 N.YS.2d at 285.
51. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(1) (McKinney 1962).
52. As in Hall, where the amount to be recovered is small, it often costs more to bring
an action than the amount of the potential recovery. Thus, many infractions of the law are
never punished because the private citizen is not in a position to enforce his statutory rights.
If class actions were allowed, it would become financially possible for attorneys to get a
reasonable fee while the consumer could vindicate his rights. On the general problem of
counsel fees in class actions see Realty Equities Corp. v. Gerosa, 30 Misc. 2d 481, 209

N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. CL 1960).
53. Committee on Legal Assistance, Committee Report on Consumer Protection, 24
Record of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 297, 298 (1969).
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1969).
2. North Carolina prescribes a maximum penalty of thirty years imprisonment for second
degree murder. Id.
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maintained that he was innocent of any crime. Subsequently, his petition for
habeas corpus was denied by the federal district court.3 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted relief on the ground that the plea had
been coerced, as evidenced by the defendant's proclamation of innocence.4 The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate ruling, finding that the plea had been
made voluntarily and knowingly in the face of strong evidence, and that the
defendant had not been deprived of his constitutional rights even though he
continued to profess innocence of the crime charged. North Carolina v. Aljord,
400 U.S. 25 (1970).
The guilty plea and plea bargaining are extensively used and sanctioned
throughout the United States. 5 In fact, an overwhelming majority of all defendants who are convicted are not tried, but are convicted on a plea of guilty.0
This plea "relieves both the defendant and the prosecution of the inevitable
risks and uncertainties of trial" 7 and enables many courts to handle their case
loads more efficiently. Most of these pleas emanate from plea arrangements or
bargaining which is "a common practice widely regarded as essential to the
effective administration of criminal justice."18
Inherent within the plea of guilty is the waiver of certain basic constitutional
rightsY The defendant waives the privilege against self-incrimination,1 ° the
right to trial by jury," and the right to confront his accusers. 12 Thus, because
of this waiver of rights implicit within the guilty plea, such a plea should be subjected to comprehensive examination and attended by proper safeguards before
it may validly be used to convict a defendant.'3 The Supreme Court stated
the basic requirements for scrutinizing the guilty plea in Kercheval v. United
States,14 holding that a "plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made
voluntarily after proper advice [of counsel] and with full understanding of the
3. Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340, 341 (4th Cir. 1968).
4. Id.
5. For a general view of the subject, see D. Newman, Conviction, The Determination of
Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 76-133 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Newman]. See also
People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
6. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 134 (1967) [hereinafter cited as President's Commission]. Approximately 90% of all convictions are based on guilty pleas. Newman 3.
7. President's Commission 135.
8. United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1970).
9. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459

(1969).
10. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466 (1969); see U.S. Const. amend. V; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
11. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466 (1969); see U.S. Const. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
12. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466 (1969); see U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

13. See United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 892 (1968).

14.

274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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consequences."'1 The rule which has developed is that a defendant must have
either conferred with counsel or waived his right to do so before a guilty plea
can be validly accepted.' 6 A plea induced by promises or threats which deprive
it of voluntariness is void, 17 even if the promises emanated from the bench.18
Generally, a conviction based upon a guilty plea is justified by the defendant's
admission that he committed the crime charged, and by his consent to dispense
with a trial on the facts. 19 The plea "is an admission of all the elements of a
formal criminal charge" 20 and, similar to a jury verdict, is conclusive as to the
defendant's guilt.2 ' When a defendant accompanies his guilty plea with a protestation of innocence he specifically negates an element necessary for conviction
because admission of guilt is generally "[c ] entral to the plea and the foundation
for entering judgement." 22 Thus, there is a suggestion that the plea, when entered
with such protestation, may not have been rendered voluntarily.
The state and lower federal courts are in conflict as to whether a guilty plea
is valid when it is ambivalent. In some jurisdictions, statements which are incongruous with the admission of guilt render the plea unacceptable. In State v.
Stacy,23 a case decided by the Supreme Court of Washington, the defendant's
guilty plea resulted from a plea bargaining agreement. During the second day
of trial the defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty when the prosecutor agreed to drop one of the charges against him. The defendant, however,
stated that he was innocent but had changed his plea on the advice of counsel.
The court rejected the "equivocal" plea, holding that "the trial court should
refuse to accept the plea until the equivocation therein has been eliminated
.... "24 Thus, the court apparently would have required the judge to delve into
15. Id. at 223-24; see Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
16. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275
(1941) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); see Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935) (deception by prosecutor invalidated plea).
18. United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court

stated that "E] guilty plea predicated upon a judge's promise of a definite sentence by its
very nature does not qualify as a free and voluntary act." Id. at 254.
19. United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 US.
892 (1968).
20. McCarthy v. United States, 394 US. 459, 466 (1969); see Hall v. United States, 259
F.2d 430 (sth Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 US. 947 (1959) ; United States v. Gallagher, 183
F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 913 (1951). See also Weir v. United States,
92 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 761 (1937) (guilty plea waives all nonjuris.
dictional defects) ; Roberto v. United States, 60 F.ad 774 (7th Cir. 1932) (guilty plea valid

even if indictment was insufficient in form); Kachnic v. United States, 53 F.d 312 (9th Cir.
1931) (guilty plea waives all defenses except that indictment charged no offense).
21. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); US. ex rel. Rosa v. Follette,
395 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 US. 892 (1968).
22. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
23. 43 Wash. 2d 358, 261 P.2d 400 (1953).
24. Id. at 363, 261 P.2d at 402. The court went on to say that "if the defendant persists

in attempting to enter such a plea, the trial court should require the defendant to stand trial

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

the underlying circumstances of the plea. In State v. Reali2u the defendant had
escaped from pretrial detention and was informed by his attorney that this
factor would increase the probability of conviction. The defendant pleaded
guilty, although maintaining his innocence. The Supreme Court of New Jersey,
in rejecting the plea, concluded that a guilty plea accompanied by an express
proclamation of innocence is invalid.2 6 Still other courts have rejected guilty
pleas which tended to deny elements of the charge, 27 or which contained statements inconsistent with guilt,28'29or which did not "manifest an unqualified admission of the offense charged."
Other jurisdictions have, to varying degrees, accepted guilty pleas accompanied
by assertions of innocence. In McCoy v. United States8" the District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that a "court is not required to insist that the accused concede
the inevitability or correctness of a verdict of guilty were the case tried."8 1
Furthermore, the defendant "might reasonably conclude a jury would be con,,82
vinced of his guilt and that he would fare better.., by pleading guilty ....
Even in jurisdictions which have allowed the acceptance of a qualified guilty
plea, the acceptance of such a plea is the "exceptional" case and the plea should
be accepted only if there exists a high probability of guilt. 88 Although an
ambivalent guilty plea should be accepted only with great caution,84 such pleas
have been accepted even when the defendant denied a requisite element of the
on the offense charged." Id.; see United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244,
255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dictum); People v. Morales, 17 App. Div. 2d 999, 234 N.Y.S.2d 92
(3d Dep't 1962) (mem.).
25. 26 N.J. 222, 139 A.2d 300 (1958) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 224, 139 A.2d at 302; see Kreuter v. United States, 201 F2d 33 (10th Cir.
1952); State v. Leyba, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 198,
453 P.2d 219 (1969).
27. E.g., Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1966). The defendant was
charged with unlawful interstate transportation of a forged check. At trial the defendant
pleaded guilty, but only admitted to endorsing the check while specificially denying any
knowledge that it was forged. Thus, a requisite element of the crime was missing, and, In

effect, the defendant proclaimed his innocence. The court refused to accept the guilty plea
because it "constitute~d] .. .little more than an ambiguous expression of qualified guilt
coupled with a protestation of innocence." Id. at 287; see People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88,
81 N.W.2d 667 (1957).
28. E.g., People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 206 N.E.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1965)
(defendant's statement indicated lesser crime); People v. Nealy, 48 Misc. 2d 328, 264
N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd mem., 28 App. Div. 2d 1094, 284 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't
1967).
29. Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1966).

30.
31.
32.
33.
States,
34.

363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Id. at 308.
Id.
Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Bruce v. United
379 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969).

19711

CASE NOTES

crime, 85 or denied recollection of the crime.38 The plea may also be accepted
where its rejection would compel the defendant to assert a defense he found
37
undesirable.
The Supreme Court itself has never dealt with a case specifically on point. The
Court has expounded and elucidated its basic ruling in Kercheval,3 8 adhering
to the premise that a plea "is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact,
voluntarily made." 39 However, a plea is not voluntary "simply because [it] ...
is the product of a sentient choice."'40 The Supreme Court has also indicated
that a guilty plea which is the product of a coerced confession is invalidV 1
In United States v. Jackson4 2 the defendant was tried under the Federal Kid-

napping Act, 43 the provisions of which allow for capital punishment only if "the

verdict of the jury shall so recommend." 44 The Supreme Court found this part

of the statute to be unconstitutional, because it "needlessly encourages"45 defendants faced with the possibility of a death sentence to waive their sixth
35. Eg., People v. Hetherington, 379 Ill. 71, 39 N.E.2d 361 (1942). Here the defendant
was accused of first degree murder. He pleaded guilty but stated that there was no premeditation. Thus, there could be no first degree murder. The court, however, accepted the
plea without qualification.
36. E.g., State v. Martinez, 89 Idaho 129, 403 P.2d 597 (1965) (defendant could not
recall commission of the crime); State ex rel. Crossley v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 116 N.W.2d
666 (1962) (defendant could not recall the crime due to his intoxication at the time of its
commission).
37. Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961). In this case defendant was
charged with public intoxication. Defendant pleaded guilty, but the municipal court refused
to accept the plea because it felt that the defendant had a defense of insanity. Defendant
was later deemed insane, and sent to a mental institution for a longer period than he would
have been incarcerated for had he been convicted. The district court felt that the plea
should have been accepted. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
38. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
39. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 US. 1, 14 (1924).
40. Haley v. Ohio, 332 US. 506, 606 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Basically the
court has stated that "real notice of the true nature of the charge . . . [is] the first and
most universally recognized requirement of due process . .. ." Smith v. O'Grady, 312 US.
329, 334 (1941).
41. Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 US. 116 (1956); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940). See generally Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some
Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 Rutgers L. Rev.
728, 755 (1963).
42. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964), which provides in part:
"(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who
has been unlawfully seized ... shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has
not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed."
44. Id. § 1201(a).
45. 390 US. at 583 (emphasis omitted).
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trial.40

amendment right to a jury
The Court
also found that the procedure
47
tended to coerce defendants to plead guilty.
In Alford the court of appeals agreed with the defendant's contention that his
plea had been coerced by the statutory scheme relating to the imposition of the
death penalty. The court felt that the distinction between the Federal Kidnapping Act, under which only the jury could impose the death penalty, and the
North Carolina statute, under which death was mandatory unless the defendant
either pleaded guilty or upon trial the jury recommended life imprisonment,
was unimportant. In either situation, the court held, the compulsion to plead
guilty to avoid the death penalty was impermissible and would render the plea
involuntary. 48 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Jackson had not
established a new test to determine whether the plea was coerced. 40 The test
remains that of voluntariness and the Court specifically disapproved the rule
enunciated by the court of appeals-that a plea entered to avoid the possibility
of a death sentence is generally to be considered to be coerced. The Court stated
that the fact "[t]that [the defendant] would not have pleaded except for the
opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that
the plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice ...
."5
Having dismissed the argument based on statutory coercion, 1 the Court was
46. Id.
47. Id. at 581-85; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), which attempted to
expand the scope of Jackson by invalidating guilty pleas given under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
(1964).
The Jackson rationale was used to invalidate part of the Federal Bank Robbery Act In

Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968) (per curiam), because that statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(e) (1964), was found to have the same constitutional infirmity. But see State v.
Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 959 (1970); State v.
Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969).
48. 405 F.2d at 349.
49. 400 U.S. at 31; see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Machlbroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223
(1927).

50. 400 U.S. at 31.
51. Concurring, Justice Black agreed with the Court, but noted that he still felt that
Jackson had been wrongly decided. Id. at 39. In Jackson, Justice Black joined In Justice
White's dissent, which stated that the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping
Act was not unconstitutional. 390 U.S. at 591. Rather, they would make "it clear that pleas
of guilty and waivers of jury trial should be carefully examined before they are accepted,
in order to make sure that they have been neither coerced nor encouraged by the death
penalty power in the jury." Id. at 592.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, wrote the dissenting opinion
in Alford. Justice Brennan referred to his dissent in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790 (1970). In Parker, the petitioner was indicted for first degree burglary, a capital offense
in North Carolina. After conferring with counsel he pleaded guilty and accepted life imprisonment. He later sought post-conviction relief by asserting that the North Carolina
statutes induced an accused to plead guilty so as to avoid a possible death penalty. The
Court held that the plea was voluntary, and the conviction was affirmed.
The dissent, in Alford, concluded that the "Court makes clear that its previous holding
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faced with the question of whether a plea of guilty accompanied by a statement
of innocence would be acceptable or whether it was so indicative of coercion as
to invalidate the plea. In Allord the defendant's guilty plea constituted a waiver
of trial without the concomitant admission of guilt, and produced a question as
to the propriety of convicting a person on that basis. Finding itself lacking in
precedents of its own and faced with a split in authority 52 in the state and lower
federal courts, the Court felt constrained to rely heavily upon two analogous
cases from which it drew relevant principles.ra
In Lynch v. Overholser-M the defendant was charged with uttering a bad check,
a misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment. The defendant desired to plead guilty, but the trial judge refused to accept the plea
because he had evidence showing that the defendant was suffering from mental
illness. Ultimately, the defendant was acquitted on the basis of insanity, and was
committed to a mental institution. The Supreme Court granted the defendant a
writ of habeas corpus because it construed the "congressional legislation seemingly authorizing the commitment as not reaching a case where the accused
preferred a guilty plea to a plea of insanity."55 Although the Lynch Court
specifically stated that there is no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted,60
the Alford Court inferred from Lynch that "there would have been no constitutional error had [Lynch's guilty] plea been accepted even though evidence before
the judge indicated that there was a valid defense." 5 7 In extracting this
rationale from Lynch, the Alford Court seems to have indicated that the defendant's objective manifestation should be accepted when to do otherwise would
force a defense on the defendant that he does not wish to raise.
In Hudson v. United States58 the Court dealt with the issue of whether a federal court could impose a prison sentence after accepting a plea of nolo contenwas intended to apply even when the record demonstrates that the actual effect of the unconstitutional threat was to induce a guilty plea from a defendant who was unwilling to
admit his guilt." 400 U.S. at 40. The dissenting Justices felt that the threat of the death
penalty must be given strong weight in determining whether the plea was voluntary, and
that denial of guilt is also a relevant factor. Id.; see 397 US. at 805 (dissenting opinion).
Taking these factors into consideration, the dissenters concluded that Alford's plea was not
voluntary, but was "'the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint.'" 400 US. at 40, quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 606 (1948) (concurring

opinion).
52. See notes 23-37 supra and accompanying text.
53. 400 U.S. at 34-35.
54. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
55. 400 U.S. at 34, interpreting Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
56. 369 U.S. at 719.
57. 400 'US. at 35; accord, Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961).
In the latter case, the district court stated that "it is a deprivation of a constitutional right
to force any defense on a defendant in a criminal case or to compel any defendant in a
criminal case to present a particular defense which be does not desire to advance." Id. at

570.
58. 272 US. 451 (1926).
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dere. 59 Hudson held that trial courts have the power to sentence after a plea of
nolo has been made.00 The Alford Court interpreted Hudson and other nolo
contendere cases 0' as "recognition that the Constitution does not bar imposition
of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his
guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and
accept the sentence."0 2
The Court recognized that in Alford, unlike Lynch and Hudson, the defendant
had not remained silent regarding his guilt, but did in fact affirmatively state
his innocence. The Court dismissed this factor by concluding that "express
admission of guilt .. .is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of
criminal penalty. '0 3 The Court felt that the evidence against Alford tended to
disprove his innocence" and that the trial judge had ample opportunity to
evaluate the record. 65 Perhaps the decision would have been different had the
evidence against the defendant been less convincing. The Court concluded by
noting that "[t]he prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas should
not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid logic render those constitutional guarantees counterproductive and put in jeopardy the very human values
they were meant to preserve." 00
The Supreme Court was ensnarled in a difficult problem and, had the Court
reached a different result, the expeditious administration of criminal justice
could have been further hindered. Plea arrangements are of great advantage to
both defendants and prosecutors, and without plea bargaining the administration
of justice would be nearly impossible.0 7 Pragmatically, "a criminal court can
operate only by inducing the great mass of actually guilty defendants to plead
guilty ....,08 However, there are inherent evils in plea negotiating. Unfortunately, it is possible that "the greatest pressures... are brought to bear on defen59. Nolo contendere is "a plea in a criminal action, having the same legal effect as a
plea of guilty, so far as regards all proceedings on the indictment, and on which the defendant may be sentenced." Black's Law Dictionary 1198 (4th ed. 1951); see Piassick v.
United States, 253 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1958). The plea of nolo may not be used against the
defendant in a subsequent civil action. Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957). For a concise history of the plea and its use, see 400
U.S. at 35-36 n.8.
60. 272 U.S. at 457.
61. See, e.g., Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961); Sullivan v. United States, 348
U.S. 170 (1954) ; Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1938); Pharr v. United States,
48 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1931).
62. 400 U.S. at 36.
63. Id. at 37.
64. "[Tlhe testimony indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from
his house, stated his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that
he had carried out the killing." Id. at 28.
65. The trial judge elicited information as to Alford's past record before sentencing, and
then decided that the maximum penalty should be imposed. Id. at 29.
66. Id. at 39.
67. United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457, 464 (2d Cir. 1970).
68. H. Lummus, The Trial Judge 46 (1937).
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dants who may be innocent."6 9 It has been suggested that a suitable description
for plea bargaining might be "composition payments to a dubious creditor".0
for it "reflect[s] a philosophy of criminal justice which regards punishment as
a payment for the crime .... "71 Under this theory it is "defense counsel's responsibility to make sure that only the proper degree of guilt is acknowledged
and only the fair penalty is paid.17 2 Nevertheless, plea bargaining offers an
advantage to the defendant in that it often "mitigate[s] the harshness of mandatory sentencing provisions"7 3 and enables the defendant to avoid facing the
risk of trial.74
Had the Supreme Court decided differently, it would have been more difficult
to obtain valid guilty pleas through the process of plea bargaining. A defendant
would have to either simply enter his plea, otherwise remaining silent as to the
question of guilt, or fully confess to the crime charged. The maintenance of plea
negotiations is of monumental importance if the criminal process is to be productive. However, it seems to be straddling the border of permissiveness when a
man is convicted of a crime which he denies committing, without a jury ever
determining guilt. Perhaps the best solution is to have a procedure similar to that
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 76 applied to all criminal
cases.
Basically, Rule 11 reiterates the previous common law standards elucidated
by the Supreme Court for accepting a guilty plea, i.e., it must be voluntary, and
the defendant must know the nature of the charge against him.1 G However, under
the rule, the court may not accept the plea unless there is an underlying factual
basis. 77 The court must determine "that the conduct which the defendant admits
constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense
included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty. Such inquiry should,
69. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, 60
(1968).
70. H. Silving, Essays on Criminal Procedure 254 (1964).
71. Id.
72. Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, Prac. Law. Jan., 1962, at 35-36.
73. President's Commission 135.
74. P. Howard, Criminal Justice in England 322 (1931).
75. These rules were promulgated by the Court under its supervisory powers and necessarily govern procedure only "in the courts of the United States and before United States
commissioners in all criminal proceedings ... . Fed. R. Crim. P. 1.
76. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 provides: "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with
the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty,
and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the
defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to
plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty . . . the court shall enter a plea of
not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied
that there is a factual basis for the plea." (Emphasis deleted.)
77. Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas,
1966 Wash. U.L.Q. 306, 310; see United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485, 503 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), afrd, 357 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966).
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e.g., protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an
understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct
does not actually fall within the charge." 78 The court is granted discretion in
making this inquiry and could, for example, determine whether the factual basis
exists by conferring with the defendant's counsel or the prosecutor.79 However,
the trial court is under no obligation to accept the guilty plea, even when the
prosecutor has agreed to do so. 80
It seems most equitable that a judge should delve into the underlying factual
basis of a charge, and should not accept a guilty plea unless he is convinced
that there is a high probability of guilt. The Court, in Allord, did note the
presence of independent evidence of guilt s ' and, indeed, the trial judge's behavior
would seem to conform to the requirements of Rule 11 ;82 however, the opportunity to make the "factual basis" test mandatory was bypassed. Its adoption
would provide a flexible and fair test to be applied uniformly throughout the
nation.

Securities-Extent of Civil Liability under the Federal Margin Requirements Expanded.-Plaintiff purchased bonds from the defendant, a broker,
on credit, and did not pay the balance due within seven business days after
the date of purchase. The defendant broker, although required by law to
sell on plaintiff's account when he did not receive such payment,' retained
78. Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 411,418 (1964).
79. Id. In the recent case of United States v. Nichols, No. 23,869 (D.C. Cir. March 8,
1971), it was held that the factual basis for the plea must be made part of the record.
Id. at 3.
80. Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1966); see ABA Project on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty § 1.6 (Tent. Draft 1967), which
apparently adopts Rule 11.
81. See note 64 supra.
82. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
1. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (2) (1970), promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (Supp. V, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a)
(1964). The regulation provides in pertinent part:
"In case a customer purchases a security (other than an exempted security) in the special
cash account and does not make full cash payment for the security within 7 days after
the date on which the security is so purchased, the creditor shall, except as provided in
subparagraphs (3) through (7) of this paragraph, promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate
the transaction or the unsettled portion thereof." Id.; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (Supp. V, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1964), which
provides in pertinent part:
"(c) It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or any broker
or dealer, directly or indirectly, to extend or maintain credit or arrange for the extension
or maintenance of credit to or for any customer"(1) on any security (other than an exempted security), in contravention of the rules
and regulations which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall prescribe under subsections (a) and (b) of this section ......
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the securities. Subsequently, the defendant's efforts to collect the balance
due proved fruitless. Because of the plaintiff's requests not to sell the securities,
defendant did not do so until six months after the purchases. 2 After lengthy
negotiations, which resulted in part payment, stipulations of settlement and a
confession of judgment, plaintiff defaulted on a new payment schedule and
judgment was entered against him on the confession in New York Supreme
Court.3 The securities were finally sold at a loss, and plaintiff then began
this action in the Federal District Court for damages suffered as a result of
defendant's failure to comply with the margin provisions of the federal securities laws.4 He sought to recover the difference between the amount he would
have received had the bonds been sold on his account on the day required by
law and the amount actually received when the bonds were sold much later.
The district court held that the defendant had violated section 7(c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934r and Regulation T of the Federal Reserve
System6 and that plaintiff had standing to sue under these provisions 7 The
court held, however, that plaintiff was bound by the stipulations of settlement
and that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York had the effect of
res judicata 8 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding defendant liable for losses suffered as a result of his failure to
comply with the federal securities laws. 9 Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,
429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
Since there is no explicit provision for civil liability in section 7(c) of the
Securities Exchange Act (the section dealing with margin requirements), 1 0
2. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1139 (2d Cir. 1970); Brief for Appellee at 7-10, Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, supra.
3. 429 F.2d at 1139. The confession of judgment provided that defendant could obtain
judgment for the debt owed by plaintiff without further notice. Id.
4. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 295 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd,
429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970); see Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); § 15(c)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
S. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (Supp. V, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 7Sg(c) (1964).
6. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(2) (1970), promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (Supp. V, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a)

(1964).
7. 295 F. Supp. at 1202.
8. Id. at 1205-07. The court of appeals held that neither the stipulations of settlement
nor the New York judgment barred a federal suit. The court stated that the settlement
involved a promise by defendant of credit, illegal under the Act. If the plaintiff did vmive
his rights he did so as the result of the finandal pressure created by this illegal continuation
of crediL In any case, regardless of the above factors, to give effect to the stipulations of
settlement would be to contravene public policy as set forth in Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1964), which holds void any stipulation of settlement
obligating a party to waive compliance with the Act. The court further stated that it did
not consider the New York judgment as effecting the merits of the federal controversy
and that therefore it did not operate as res judicata. 429 F.2d at 1143-45.
9. 429 F.2d at 1145.

10. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (Supp. V, 1970),
amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1964). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifically pro-
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there has been considerable comment as to what the scope of that liability
should be.' Generally, implied civil liability under a criminal statute has
been justified on the theory that a statute sets a standard of conduct "for all
members of the community, from which it is negligence to deviate. ' 12 Thus,
in order to imply civil liability it is necessary to find that one of the purposes
of the Act was to protect the interests of an individual in a position like the
plaintiff's. 13 The courts, in interpreting section 7(c), have frequently cited
the statements made in the House Reports on the Securities Exchange Bill
of 193414 to show the purposes of Congress in enacting the margin regulations."
In relying on these statements the courts have recognized that the primary
purpose of the margin requirements was to control the amount of credit
available for investment, but have also found that the protection of the investor was a secondary aim of Congress."1 This conclusion was first drawn in
vides for civil liability in three sections: § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964); § 16(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964); § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964). Liability has consistently been
implied in certain other sections, e.g., the anti-fraud provisions, Securities Act of 1933,
§ 17(a)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)-(3) (1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a), (b) (1964) ; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
11. See, e.g., Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil Liability, 66
Colum. L. Rev. 1462 (1966); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285 (1963); Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 858 (1948); Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934Civil Remedies Based Upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 61
Mich. L. Rev. 940 (1963).
12. W. Prosser, Torts § 35, at 191 (3d ed. 1964). This viewpoint is supported by Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934) which states:
"The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by falling to do
a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
"(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the
other as an individual; and
"(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and,
"(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard,
the invasion of the interests results from that hazard; and,
"(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted
himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action."
13. Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
14. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). "Nor is the main purpose even
protection of the small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread himself too
thinly-although such a result will be achieved as a byproduct of the main purpose.
"The main purpose is to . . . [reduce] the aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock market .... ." Id. at 8.
15. E.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Moscarelli v. Stamm,
288 F. Supp. 453, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670,
673 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Myer v. Shields & Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 126, 127, 267 N.Y.S.2d 872,
874 (1st Dep't 1966).
16. See cases cited note 15 supra.
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Rernar v. Clayton Securities Corp.,'7 a landmark case that the courts have
since relied on to consistently imply civil liability under section 7(c).18
Since liability based on traditional tort concepts sounds in negligence, it
would seem logical that the scope of such liability should be limited by principles of negligence law, such as proximate cause, contemplated risk and contributory negligence.P9 The courts, however, in deciding cases involving section
7(c) violations, have generally not dealt with this issue.20 In Remar, the court
implied that traditional negligence defenses would not bar recovery in actions
brought under section 7(c), in that "[p]laintiff's right of action is not affected
by his participation as borrower in the transaction . . . . Since the statute
was passed for the benefit of people like plaintiff, and since the legislature
regarded him as incapable of protecting himself, he is not disabled from suing
1
for the injury he sustained.'

On the other hand, in a recent federal case, Moscarelli v. Stamm-" the

district court interpreted Remar as merely holding that the plaintiff's participation in the transaction would not by itself bar recovery, and stated in dicta that
the broker's implied liability was not absolute, but was subject "to the traditional tort concepts of causation and contributory negligence ... ."* In other
cases the courts, departing from the traditional tort defenses, have indicated
that the sophistication of the investor should be considered as a possible bar
to his recovery.24 There have been no decisions, however, actually denying
17.

81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).

18. See, e.g., Junger v. Hertz, Neumark & Warner, 426 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 880 (1970); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 196S),
affd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Moscarelli v. Stammr,
288 F. Supp. 453-(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959); Glickman v.
Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Myer v. Shields & Co., 25 App. Div.
2d 126, 267 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1st Dep't 1966).
19. See W. Prosser, Torts § 49, at 282 (proximate cause), § 50, at 288 (contemplated
risk), § 64, at 426 (contributory negligence) (3d ed. 1964). See also Note, Federal Margin
Requirements as a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1462, 1471-73 (1966).
20. See, e.g., cases cited note 18 supra, where these problems were never resolved.
21. 81 F. Supp. at 1017; see Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil
Liability, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1462, 1473 (1966). See also Ayer v. Shields & Co., 25 App. Div.
2d 126, 128, 267 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1st Dep't 1966).
22. 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. Id. at 459-60.
24. Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); E.F. Hutton v. Weinberg, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,332, at 94,406 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1964); d. Royal Air Properties, Inc.
v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp. 615
(D. Mass. 1955); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955). Support for this
viewpoint can also be found in the testimony of a member of the Federal Reserve Board
given at a House hearing on the Securities Exchange Bill. The testimony indicated particular concern for the small speculator as opposed to the large buyer who a'very likely
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recovery to an investor on the basis of either his contributory negligence or
his sophistication, although some commentators have indicated that some type
25
of contributory fault should be a valid defense.
An alternative theory upon which civil liability has been implied for violation of a criminal statute, totally independent of the negligence theory is the
public policy rationale.26 Under this theory, liability would be imposed if the
purposes of the statute were thereby furthered, regardless of whether the
statute was actually intended to protect persons like the plaintiff, and regardless
of any participation of plaintiff in bringing about the violation complained
of.27 The first decision to base recovery on this public policy rationale as an
independent theory of recovery was IJ. Case Co. v. Borak.28 In that case, the
Supreme Court justified a private remedy to enforce the proxy rules promulgated under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,2 D on the ground
that such enforcement would provide a necessary supplement to Commission
action.30 In favoring this broader theory of recovery, the Court made no mention of tort concepts. Thus the uncertainty surrounding the nature and extent
of civil liability under a criminal statute has been complicated by the addition
of what appears to be an independent ground for recovery, separate and apart
from common law negligence, based solely on whether 31"the private remedy will
further the broad congressional goals of the statute."
This new basis for liability was given added impetus by the Supreme Court
[isla person who knows the game ... " Hearings on H.R. 9323 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1934).
25. "That the statute does not require compliance by the borrower with the margin
provisions hardly suggests that he is relieved of all responsibility when he asserts a right
of recovery which is based on common law negligence. The defense of-contributory negligence should, then, be available . .. ." Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for
Civil Liability, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1462, 1473 (1966). "EN]ot all margin traders are 'innocent lambs'; in fact, many are sophisticated investors . . . . The margin trader, not the
broker-dealer, is a speculator, and he knowingly assumes the risk of purchasing securities
on an inadequate margin. It seems doubtful that Congress intended that all margin traders
be treated as a special class of persons requiring protection from their own lack of Judgment." Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Civil Remedies Based Upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 940, 948 (1963).
26. In one case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, while deciding the case
according to traditional tort rules, discussed the general purpose of the Securities Exchange Act-the protection of the investor-as a reason for imposing civil liability. Baird
v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
27. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 285 (1963); Note, Implied Liability under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 858 (1948). See also Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil
Liability, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1462, 1474-77 (1966); Comment, Private Rights and Federal
Remedies: Herein of J.I. Case v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.AJL. Rev. 1150 (1965).
28. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
30. 377 U.S. at 432.
31. Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
1462, 1475 (1966).
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decision in Pernma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,32 in which

the defense of in pari delicto in anti-trust cases was undermined if not completely abandoned. 33 The Court was considering the question of the plaintiff's
wrongful conduct in connection with an action for treble damages resulting
from violations of a regulatory statute.34 In refusing to accept the in pari
delicto defense, Justice Black pointed out that the Supreme Court has often
stated its disapproval of invoking "broad common-law barriers to relief where
a private suit serves important public purposes.'135 He added that a "more
fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties would only result
in seriously undermining the usefulness of the private action .... rG
The only case that actually considered the negligence and public policy
theories and, in addition, a contract theory of civil liability under a regulatory
statute was Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank.3

7

The plaintiff had obtained

loans from defendant bank, enabling him to purchase securities that subsequently declined in price. He sought to recover his resulting losses on the
ground that the loans were made in violation of Regulation U of the Federal
Reserve System. s The defendant, by a counterclaim, sought to recover the
present unpaid balance of the loan. The court found that the plaintiff, an
experienced investor, represented to the bank that he desired a loan for the
purpose of purchasing bonds.3 9 Since transactions involving bonds are not
within the scope of Regulation U, a loan to finance their purchase would
present no problem. Between Septemeber 12, 1958 and Mlarch 3, 1961, the
bank made several loans to Serzysko. In each instance Serzysko signed a statement of purpose, indicating that the particular loan was "not for the purpose
of purchasing or carrying any stock registered on a national securities exchange." 40 In 1965, after the stock market had declined and the bank had
sold the collateral for the loan, the plaintiff filed suit against the bank, claiming
that he used the proceeds of the loan "exclusively for the purpose of purchasing
or carrying registered securities," 41 and that the defendant knew or should
have known "that [the plaintiff] was using the proceeds of the loans for such
32. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
33. Mr. Justice Black wrote for only four justices in his majority opinion. Mr. Justice
Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in part and dissented in part. The three remaining justices, in concurring opinions, recognized the defense of in pad delicto in some modified
form.
34. 392 US. at 135-36.
35. Id. at 138.
36. Id. at 139.
37. 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

396 U.S. 904 (1969).
38. 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a) (1970). "[N]o bank shall extend any credit secured directly
or indirectly by any stock for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any margin stock in
an amount exceeding the maximum loan value of the collateral, as prescribed from time to
time for stocks in § 221.4 ... *" Id. § 221.1(a) (1).
39. 290 F. Supp. at 84.
40. Id. at 81.
41. Id. at 83.
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purposes. ' 42 The defendant contended that Serzysko's conduct in deliberately
was such as to bar recovery under Regumisstating his purpose in borrowing,
43
lation U and the 1934 Act.
The court, having first recognized the existence of a private remedy under
the margin requirements, 44 attempted to determine the nature and extent of
such liability, as related to a plaintiff who had "knowingly and intentionally
procured or induced the violations of which he now complains. 'l1 A contract
theory was examined by the court as a possible basis for recovery, one that
was used by a court in a case involving violation of Regulation T.40 Then,
without approving or disapproving the contract approach, the court turned to
the tort theory of recovery and analyzed that approach as it related to plaintiff's misconduct. 47 In apparently choosing to rely on the tort rather than the
contract theory, the court implied that the plaintiff might be barred by failing
to satisfy the requirement "that the complaining party 'has not so conducted
himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.' ",48 It was stated by
the court that this requirement should be considered in the light of J.1. Case
and Perma Life. However, while recognizing that these two opinions enunciated
a changed policy toward private lawsuits brought under federal regulatory
statutes, the court continued to use traditional tort concepts in analyzing the
facts of the case.49 But in denying recovery to the plaintiff, the court stated
that recovery would not further the purposes of the statute, and ignored the
issue of plaintiff's misconduct.? Thus the court adhered to the traditional tort
approach to liability, but based its holding on the principles set forth in JJ.
Case and Perma Life.51
In Pearlstein there was no evidence of deceit or actual misrepresentation on
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 85.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 87.
46. Id., citing Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 1959), which held
that a private action by an investor against a broker for a violation of Regulation T could
be "ex contractu, based on the contract between stockbroker and customer as affected
by the federal statute and regulations . . . ." See also Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199
F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), in which the court refused to dismiss a complaint
where the plaintiff sought either recission or damages, holding that since every contract
which violates any provision of the federal securities regulations is void and unenforceable
by the party who is the violator, "the other party is entitled to recission."
47. 290 F. Supp. at 88-90.
48. Id. at 88, quoting Restatement of Torts § 286(d) (1934).
49. 290 F. Supp. at 88-90. The court also distinguished Perma Life on the grounds that
the action in Perma Life was based on an express statutory provision; that a plaintiff as a
participant would "be subject to statutory civil and criminal penalties;" and that defendant
had knowingly participated in the violation. Id. at 89.
50. Id. at 89-90. The court also denied recovery to the defendant on his counterclaim.
Id. at 90.
51. See 1969 Wash. U.L.Q. 361 for a more detailed analysis of the court's opinion in
Serzysko.
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the part of the plaintiff, as there had been in Serzysko. The defendant asserted
that plaintiff was "knowledgeable in the securities field."52 and attributed to
him a "conscious plan" to profit from what he knew would be an unlawful
extension of credit.53 The court dismissed these contentions stating that Pearlstein's subjective knowledge of both the margin requirements and of market
operations generally would be difficult to prove, and in any event should not
defeat liability on the part of the broker.54
The court thus did not consider common law negligence and possible defenses
thereto. It utilized, instead, the "public policy" rationale of J.I. Case:
[T]he danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupulous investor is outweighed by
the salutary policing effect which the threat of private suits for compensatory damages
can have upon brokers and dealers above and beyond the threats of governmental
action by the Securities and Exchange Commission.r 5
The Pearlsteindecision went beyond that in Perma Life, for while Perma Life
would continue to deny recovery to a plaintiff who was not coerced and who
had benefited from the illegality equally with the defendant, 0 the court found
that "such a defense does not appear desirable in the securities area here involved, even when the investor may be shown to have had knowledge of margin
requirements.1 57 The court was able to distinguish securities cases from antitrust cases because the securities laws place the entire burden of compliance
with the margin requirements on the broker, while the anti-trust laws are
directed against both parties to the illegal transaction. 8 This indicated to the
court that Congress intended to make the broker completely responsible for
compliance with the margin requirements, at least in the absence of actual
"concealment or misstatement of material facts" by the investor.P
judge Friendly, in his dissent, commented that the majority opinion "shocks
the conscience and wars with common sense."60 Although accepting the public
52. 429 F.2d at 1140.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1141-42. The court held that most of the cases cited by the defendant were
inapplicable since they dealt with the broker's right to sue for the original contract price
of the securities. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Billings Assoc.,
Inc. v. Bashaw, 27 App. Div. 2d 124, 276 N.Y.S.2d 446 (4th Dep't 1967) ; E.F. Hutton & Co.
v. Weinberg, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,332, at 94,406 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. 1964) ; Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31 MIfsc. 2d 628, 220 N.YS.2d 1001 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. 1961). See also Bronner v. Goldman, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 3S U.S.
933 (1966), where the court found there had been no violation of the margin requirements.
The majority also distinguished Moscarelli and Serzysko on the ground that the facts in
those cases went "beyond knowledge of the margin requirements to concealment or misstatement of material facts." 429 F.2d at 1142. See id. at 1141-42 n.9.
55. 429 F.2d at 1141, citing J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
56. 429 F.2d at 1141.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1141-42.
60. Id. at 1145.
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policy rationale used by the majority, 61 Judge Friendly expressed doubts that
the purposes of section 7(c) would be furthered by the degree of private enforcement indicated by the majority opinion 62 and stated that "[a]ny deterrent
effect of threatened liability on the broker may well be more than offset by the
inducement to violations inherent in the prospect of a free ride for the customer
who, under the majority's view, is placed in the enviable position of 'heads-I-win
tails-you-lose.' "63 The dissent recognized that there may be cases where it is
proper to impose civil liability under section 7(c), e.g., in the case of the
"innocent 'lamb,' "" but asserted Pearlstein, as an "experienced speculator,"
did not fit into this category and therefore, should be denied recovery. 65
The court in Pearlstein appeared to place a nearly absolute liability on the
broker for failure to comply with section 7(c), viewing that section as imposing
a strict duty on brokers and dealers to know and obey the margin requirements,
since "[n] o broker can conscientiously claim to have been misled into extending
credit beyond the seven-day limit ... ."" The theory of a cause of action in
negligence for the violation of a statute was thus ignored and perhaps abandoned by the court in favor of a theory of recovery based solely on public
policy considerations. The one remaining area of uncertainty is whether or not
these considerations would permit recovery in a situation such as the Serzysko
case, where the defendant broker was actually and intentionally deceived by
67
the investor.
The major question raised by this decision is whether it really effectuates
the purposes of the margin requirements. Judge Friendly, in his dissent, maintained that the legislative history of section 7(c) "affords scant evidence that
protection of the investor loomed at all large in the Congressional mind. 68s
The dissent, in basic agreement with one commentator who concluded that the
beneficial effects of such liability were dubious, 0 went on to state:
Occasional and isolated violations of Regulation T do not threaten to cause a significant alteration in the allocation of credit in the economy; only widespread or repeated
violations would pose a danger. But it is in just such situations that we may confidently 70expect application of the administrative and criminal sanctions provided by
the Act.
The majority opinion in Pearlstein held that the best way to protect against
61. Id. at 1147-48.
62. Id. at 1148.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum).

65. 425 F.2d at 1148-49. Judge Friendly cited Moscarelli and Serzysko as supporting his
conclusions. Id.
66. Id. at 1141.
67. The majority declined to either attack or follow the holdings in Serzysko and
Moscarelli. Id. at 1142.
68. Id. at 1147.
69. See Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Civil Remedies Based Upon Illegal
Extension of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 940, 954-55 (1963).

70. 429 F.2d at 1147-48.
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violation of the margin requirements was to place the entire burden of compliance on the broker. Whether this responsibility should result in the nearly
absolute liability impose by the Pearlsteincourt will certainly be the subject of
much debate. The arguments in favor of the opinion are persuasive. The law
does place the entire burden of compliance on the broker. It can hardly be
argued that the broker overlooked the margin requirements-in this case from
April to August. Such a flagrant violation of the law, for whatever reason, may
best be prevented by the heavy financial penalty imposed by Pearlstein. The
problems of "heads-I-win tails-you-lose," feared by the dissent, would never
arise if the broker, threatened by certain civil liability, liquidated the investor's
holdings at the time required by law.

Securities Regulation--Commission "No Action" Decision Held Review-

able-Proposal of a Limited Political Nature may be a Proper Subject for
Shareholder Action.-A spokesman for the Medical Committee for Human
Rights informed the Dow Chemical Company that the committee, as a shareholder of Dow, wished to submit a proposal to the shareholders in the management proxy statement.' The proposal was that the certificate of incorporation
be amended to prohibit Dow from manufacturing napalm. 2 Dow notified the
Securities and Exchange Commission of its intention to exclude the Medical
Committee's proposal from its proxy statement, enclosing an opinion letter from
its counsel containing the reasons which formed the basis of its decision.3 The
Commission's Division of Corporate Finance, in a "no action" letter, acquiesced
1. The request was made pursuant to Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rule
14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969), which provides for the inclusion of shareholder
proposals in management's proxy statement under certain circumstances.
2. The original proposal was to prohibit Dow from selling napalm unless the purchaser
gave assurances that the substance would not be used against human beings. It was submitted in March of 1968, too late to be included in the 1968 proxy materials. In January,
1969, the proposal was resubmitted but when Dow's counsel objected, it was withdrawn and
the proposal at issue substituted. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659,
661-63 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.SL.W. 3409 (U.S. March 22, 1971) (No. 1162).
3. Dow's counsel claimed that the proposal was of a political nature and interfered with
the company's ordinary business operations. The company relied on Proxy Rule 14a-8(c)
which provides, in relevant part: "[Mianagement may omit a proposal . . . under any of
the following circumstances:
"(1) If the proposal as submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper
subject for action by security holders; or
"(2) If it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder ... primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political . . . social or similar
causes; or
"(5) If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management take
action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations
of the issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1969).
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in Dow's decision. 4 The Medical Committee attempted to argue the suitability
of the proposal before the Commission but was unsuccessful. It then sought
review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. The court held that direct judicial review was the most effective method
of carrying out the congressional intent embodied in the Securities Exchange

Act, and that exclusion of the proposal as being of a general political nature and
concerning ordinary business decisions may be inconsistent with the congressional policy of corporate democracy embodied in the Securities Exchange Act.
Because of the inadequate record before the court, the case was remanded to the
Commission for further proceedings. Medical Committee for Human Rights
v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S.
March 22, 1971) (No. 1162).
Various statutes provide for direct review of administrative agency decisions
by the circuit courts. 5 If there is no specific statutory provision providing for

review, a party can seek review under the provisions of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,6 which supplements the special statutory review procedures for final orders of various agencies. 7 Even where a specific statute or

the Administrative Procedure Act does not provide for review, the courts have
evidenced a marked tendency to review agency decisions,8 occasionally even disregarding statutory language to the contrary. 9
4.

"[I]n a no-action letter, an authorized staff official may state with respect to a

specific proposed transaction that the staff will not recommend to the Commission that It
take enforcement action if the transaction is consummated in the manner described in the
incoming letter." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8931 (July 14, 1970), (1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,838 at 83,979.
5. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964) (orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission
under the Securities Exchange Act reviewable by the courts of appeal) ; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51
(Supp. V, 1970) (final orders of the Federal Communications Commission, Secretary of
Agriculture, Federal Maritime Commission or Maritime Administration, and Atomic Energy
Commission reviewable); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964) (final orders of the Nationnl Labor
Relations Board reviewable). For a list of these provisions and others see 1 W. Barron
& A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure with Forms § 58, at 313-15 (1960).
The statutes are not consistent as to the type of order reviewable and the standing required
of the party seeking review. E.g., the issuance of a cease and desist order is a prerequisite
before review of a Federal Trade Commission order is allowed. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964).
However, other statutes only require a party to be aggrieved by agency action in order to
seek review. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (Supp. V, 1970); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964); see K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise §§ 22.00-22.21, at 702-87 (Supp. 1970) for a discussion of the
standing needed to seek review. See also L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action
501-31 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe]. For a critical discussion of the types of orders
required before a party can request judicial review see Jaffe 418-23.
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. V, 1970). "[R]eview provisions [of the Act] utilize traditional equity actions for agency action not amounting to a final order, but which nonetheless directly affects [a] plaintiff's rights." Bucks County Cable TV, Inc. v. United States,
299 F. Supp. 1325, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1969) rev'd on other grounds, 427 F.2d 438 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
7. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-42 (1967) ; see Jaffe 164-65.
8. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41, 146 (1967).
9. "Mere failure [of the statute] to provide for judicial intervention is not conclusive;
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Section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act' 0 provides that "[a]ny person
aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission" may seek review in the court
of appeals." The first case arising under this section was American Sumatra
Tobacco Corp. v. SEC.' - In this case the petitioner sought to prevent the Commission from making public certain documents filed in connection with a license
proceeding. When its efforts proved unsuccessful, petitioner sought review in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Commission
moved to dismiss claiming the only type of order reviewable was "one entered
... after notice and opportunity for hearing, and upon a finding of facts."1 3 In
rejecting this contention, the court stated that it could review any Commission
action which satisfied the following criteria: "[T]hat there be (a) a proceeding
under the [Securities Exchange] Act, (b) to which the petitioner was a party,
(c) and that he be aggrieved by the order of the Commission."' 4
Other circuits have refrained from reviewing orders which were interlocutory

or informal. In SEC v. Andrews' 5 the second circuit refused to review an order
of the Commission calling for an investigation of whether or not the defendant's

unlisted trading privileges should be suspended, holding that such an order was
interlocutory and thus not reviewable under section 25(a) of the Securities Ex-

change Act.'6 The current rule in the second circuit is that preliminary determinations cannot be reviewed under section 25(a) unless they become the basis of

a final order. 17
In Medical Committee the petitioner sought review of the Commission decision under section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. The court decided that
the Medical Committee was an "aggrieved party" under the section and could

seek review of the Commission decision.' 8 In this regard the court noted that,
neither is the presence of language which appears to bar it" Heikila v. Barber, 345 U.S.
229, 233 (1953). There are, however, certain matters which the courts refrain from revieving.
See, e.g., Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960) (administrative determination involved
trading with the enemy); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (activation of
reserve fleet not reviewable since it involved national defense strategy and was a matter
within agency discretion). For a discussion of statutory and non-statutory exclusions from
judicial review see Jaffe 353-76.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964).
11. Id.
12. 93 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
13. Id. at 238.
14. Id. at 239.
15. 88 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937).
16. Id. at 442.
17. M.G. Davis & Co. v. Cohen, 369 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), afl'g 256 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) ; Klastorin v. Roth, 353 F.2d 182, 183 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965); accord, Guaranty Underwriters, Inc. SEC, 131 F.2d 370 (Sth Cir. 1942). For a similar interpretation of the
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 see Resources Corp. Int'l v. SEC, 97 F.2d 788 (7th
Cir. 1938) ; Jones v. SEC, 79 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.. 70S (1936).
18. 432 F.2d at 667-68; see Jaffe 418-23.
The test to determine standing to review agency action is "whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Association of Data
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at the time of the petition, the Medical Committee had already been through
two stages of administrative proceedings' 9 and the merits of the proposal had

not yet been reached, despite the fact that time is generally of the essence in a
proxy solicitation."

Furthermore, in any private action against Dow in a dis-

trict court, the resources of the Commission would not be available to the
Medical Committee which, moreover, would be handicapped by the adverse

decision of the Commission. 21 The court characterized the Commission's argument that review was precluded since it had not issued a binding order but had
only refused to order Dow to include the proposal, as analogous to the "negative
order doctrine" which the Supreme Court had rejected in 1939 because it failed
to reflect the primary considerations of judicial review.2 2 The court stated that
there exists a "well-established principle that there is a strong presumption in
favor of the courts' power to review administrative action," 23 and regardless of
its "form," the order operated with "sufficient particularity and finality to warrant judicial review."'24 The court found no reason "why the absence of formal
adjudicatory hearings in the regulatory scheme should render Commission decisions, however capricious or erroneous, utterly immune to direct judicial review
25
or redress."
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970).
19. The first stage was the submission of memoranda to the Commission staff and, after
the no action letter, the second stage was the submission of memoranda requesting a hearing
before the Commission to review the staff action. 432 F.2d at 663.
20. Id. at 667.
21. Id. Certain sections of the Securities Exchange Act authorize private actions, e.g.,
§ 9(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964) (private suits for damages sustained as a result of securities
manipulation authorized); § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1964) (private action to recover
insider's short swing profits authorized). The Supreme Court has held that there is an
implied right to bring a private action for violation of the proxy rules under § 14(a),
despite the absence of explicit language in the statute. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964). This has been extended to provide that damages are not necessary to establish a
cause of action. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
The filing of a proxy statement shall not be deemed a finding that the Commission has
passed on the merits or approved any statement contained in it. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(b)
(1969). However, there are cases which have given weight to the Commission review. E.g.,
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1026 (1969); Sherman v. Posner, 266 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
22. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939). The negative order
doctrine theorized that "when a complaint was filed with the [Interstate Commerce]
Commission against a rate or other condition and the Commission-even after hearingentered an order which found the complaint unwarranted and refused to change the status
quo, the order was not reviewable by the statutory route or by any other method. It seemed
to be thought that since the order commanded nothing and therefore could not be disobeyed,
it was not in truth an 'order'." Jaffe 359 (footnotes omitted).
23. 432 F.2d at 666.
24. Id. at 668.
25. Id. at 671. Since the petitioner did not seek a review of the factual findings of the
Commission, but only a hearing before the Commission, there was no reason for a private
action to be brought in a federal district court. The necessary hearing could be ordered
by an appellate court. Id. at 672.
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The court concluded its discussion of reviewability by pointing out that the

primary purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is the protection of investors
and that this purpose is better effectuated by Commission proceedings than

by private litigation.26 Direct judicial review of such proceedings is the only
way to determine whether the Commission has correctly considered the merits

of the shareholder's proposal in light of congress' intent in enacting the proxy
statute. 7

Proxy rule 14a-8 28 determines when management must place a shareholder's

proposal in its proxy statement.29 The purpose of the rule is to "place stock-

holders in a position to bring before their fellow stockholders matters of concern to them as stockholders in such corporation."310 The Commission has, by
its proxy rules, eliminated certain matters from inclusion, specifically those
which are not a proper subject for shareholder action under state law; 31 those
of a general economic, political, or social nature;32 and those which pertain to
the ordinary business operations of the issuer or its management.33
Pursuant to its rules the Commission excludes a substantial number of proposals annually.3 4 Although state law is supposedly determinative of the issue
of whether or not certain proposals constitute a proper subject for shareholder
action, 5 the various state statutes frequently do not provide a clear guideline,36 and thus the decision is ultimately within Commission discretion. 7 Invoking other portions of the rule, the Commission has excluded such proposals
as one to censure the board of directors and declare them ineligible for reelec26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969).
29. Id. § 240.14a-8(c). The rule does not apply to election contests or mere opposition to
management proposals. Id. § 240.14a-8(a).
30. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638 (Jan. 3, 1945), 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 124,102, at 17,617 (1969).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1) (1969).
32. Id. § 240.14a-8(c) (2).
33. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(5). Other sections provide for exclusion if the proposal did not
receive a stated amount of the vote at a prior meeting or if it was included in a prior proxy
statement and not brought up at an annual meeting. Id. §§ 240.14a-8(c) (3) & 8(c) (4).
Contrary to the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 which authorizes the Commiscion
to prohibit the sale of securities by its own order if the registration statement does not comply
with Commission rules, the Commission must seek an injunction to prohibit proxy solicitations
in violation of the proxy rules. Compare Securities Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1964), with
Securities Exchange Act §§ 14(a), 27, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78aa (1964). See 2 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 931 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
34. See, e.g., 36 SEC Ann. Rep. 47 (1970); see also 2, S Loss 911, 2859 (2d ed. 1961,
Supp. 1969).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1969). "[Mlanagement may omit a proposal ...
[if it] is,
under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper subject for action by security holders!'
36. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 1568, § 54 (1970) ("The directors may exercise all the
powers of the corporation, except such as . . . conferred upon or reserved to the stockholders.'); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-61(d) (1965) ("Any matter relating to the affairs of a
corporation is a proper subject for action at an annual meeting of shareholders .. .
37. 2 Loss 905-06.
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tion;88 one directing management to institute suit against an investment advisor; 8 9 a variety of others complaining of double taxation of dividends; 40
another requesting revision of antitrust laws; 41 and even one to change management's investment policy.42 Generally, the Commission has required inclusion of
proposals dealing with cumulative
voting,43 pre-emptive rights, 44 and changes
45
directors.
in the number of
Although the Commission's administration of the proxy rules has frequently
been criticized as inconsistent, 46 the prior reluctance of the courts to review its
decisions has resulted in a scarcity of judicial guidelines. The leading case involving shareholder proposals is SEC v. Transamerica Corp.47 In Transamerica
the proposals sought to be included called for: independent auditors of the
corporate financial records to be selected by the shareholders; amendment of
the corporate by-laws concerning the notice provisions necessary for amendment of the by-laws at annual meetings; and the adoption of a requirement that
a report of the annual meeting be sent to shareholders. 4 The third circuit rejected the claim that the notice provisions contained in the by-laws allowed
the directors to exclude these subjects from shareholder consideration and found
all three proposals to be proper for inclusion. 40 The court also found that the
notice provisions in the by-laws were being used to avoid having the shareholders vote on proposals and that this was in derogation of the congressional
purpose in enacting the Securities Exchange Act, which was to give shareholders
corporate suffrage and thus afford them a modicum of participation in the decision-making process. 50
Exclusion was held proper under the proxy rules in Curtin v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,5' which concerned a proposal to increase pensions
38. Dyer v. SEC, 289 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1961).
39. Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule: A Decade Later, 40 Notre
Dame Law. 13, 20 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Clusserath]. Examples mentioned by Mr.

Clusserath in his article were not from public records but rather from his own experience
while a member of the Commission staff. Id. at 14 n.7, 17.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

2 Loss 902 n.179.
Id.
Id.
35 SEC Ann. Rep. 47 (1969).
Id.
Clusserath 25-26.
Id. at 39-41; see 2 Loss 906-07.
163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
Id. at 517. An additional proposal to move the location of the annual meeting had

become moot by the time the case was decided. Id. at 513 n.1.
49.

Id. at 518. By-Law 47 provided that shareholders could amend the by-laws by a

majority vote but the proposed amendment must be contained in the notice of meeting,
thus if the corporation did not give the notice then the shareholders could not vote on the
shareholder proposal. Id. at 516.
50. Id. at 518.
51. 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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submitted by a union which owned one share of corporate stock. The court
reasoned that pensioners' rights, as part of the ordinary business of the corporation, were the concern of management, not of the shareholders5 2
At issue in Peck v. Greyhound Corp.53 was a shareholder proposal entitled "A
Recommendation that Management Consider the Advisability of Abolishing the
Segregated Seating System in the South." The Commission concurred with
Greyhound that the proposal was of a general political nature and was therefore
excludable. The shareholder then sued in the Southern District of New York
and the court denied an injunction prohibiting management from soliciting
proxies unless the proposal was included, deferring to the Commission's interpretation of its own rules." No argument had been made by the shareholder
that adoption of the proposal would result in any gain, either financial or in
the terms of public relations, to the corporation. The proposal was thus viewed
as purely political. 55 Furthermore the elimination of segregated seating would
have been a violation of state laws which had not yet been invalidated."0
Other cases wherein proposals of a political nature were at issue have been
decided on other grounds. In Brooks v. Standard Oil Co. (NJ.), 7 for example,
the proposal at issue called for the corporation to explore and develop underwater oil reserves and, in addition, to establish a "stable international regime"
to oversee the proper development of these reserves. The corporation, the Commission, and ultimately the court, while praising the shareholder's motive, excluded the proposal as improper under the state law providing that the business
of the corporation shall be managed by its board of directors.5 8 The court thus
did not consider the political nature of the proposal.
The court in Medical Committee, enunciating the principle that "[a] corporation is run for the benefit of its stockholders and not for that of its managers,"59 pointed out that some shareholder proposals may affect the shareholders as owners of the corporation notwithstanding their political nature.rDow's rejection of the Medical Committee's proposal as both of a general
52. Id. at 198.
53. 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
54. "Rules and regulations adopted by administrative agencies pursuant to Congressional
authorization are best interpreted . . . by the agency which has been entrusted with the
power and authority to write them." Id. at 681.
55. Id. at 679. Compare 432 F.2d at 681.
56. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 48, §§ 301(31a)-(31c) (1958), held unconstitutional in
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (MID. Ala.), aft'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 58-1491 to -1496 (1962), held unconstitutional in Flemming v. South Carolina
Electric & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 US. 901 (1956).
57. 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
58. Id. at 814. The defendant had claimed the proposal was not a proper subject under
state law, was of a general political nature, and interfered with ordinary business operations.
Id. at 812.

59. 432 F.2d at 681, quoting SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F2d at 517.
60. 432 F.2d at 681.
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political nature and as relating to ordinary business operations was characterized as impaling the Medical Committee on the "horns of [a] dilemma."01
The court could not reconcile the claim that the proposal was too specific and
too general, and therefore excludable for both reasons, with the underlying
policy of the Act which sought to make proxy solicitation a vehicle of corporate
democracy.0 2 The court pointed out that the two exceptions, thus construed,
could result in the exclusion of any shareholder proposal in total frustration of
the aforementioned policy. 3
With respect to the exception that the proposal was improper under state law,
as a general rule management has the burden of showing that a proposal is
thus excludable.64 Dow argued that the proposal was improper under Delaware
law, but according to the court did not sustain its burden.05 Under Delaware law
corporate by-laws can be amended for almost any purpose, even to change the
nature of the business of the corporation. 0 The court reasoned that certain items
which might arguably67 involve ordinary business operations are thus proper
for shareholder action.
The more substantial question was whether or not an interpretation of the
proxy rules, which would permit Dow to exclude this proposal from its proxy
statement because it was motivated by general political concerns, would conflict
with congressional intent.0 8 The court did not decide this issue, however, because
the record did not support Dow's argument that this proposal was of a general
political nature.0 9 Moreover, this proposal could be interpreted as affecting
Dow's shareholders as such since the decision to continue the manufacture
and sale of napalm was not a decision made "because of business considerations
but in spite of them." 70 Thus, the court concluded, the determination whether
61. Id. at 679.
62. Id. at 678-79; see S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
63. 432 F.2d at 678-79.
64. Id. at 680; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4979
(Jan. 6, 1954).
65. 432 F.2d at 680. Dow did not refer to any specific applicable statute.
66. Delaware Code Ann. tit. 8, 242(a) (2) (Supp. 1968). "(A] corporation may amend
its certificate of incorporation ... [tio change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of
its business or its corporate powers and purposes .... " Id. But see id. § 141(a): "The
business of every corporation ... shall be managed by a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." A New Jersey statute
similar to § 141(a) was held to exclude the proposal in Brooks v.Standard Oil Co., (N.J.),
308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
67. 432 F.2d at 680. The consequence of this interpretation of the Delaware statute is
significant since approximately one third of the corporations listed on the New York Stock
Exchange are incorporated in Delaware. H. Henn, Corporations § 1, at 6 (2d ed. 1970).
68. 432 F.2d at 680.
69. Id. The mere mention by Dow's counsel of the protests and demonstrations against
the company because of its manufacture of napalm was not, in itself, sufficient to support
Dow's contention that the proposals were political in nature. Id.
70. Id. at 681 (emphasis by the court).
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corporate assets should be used in a profitable or socially useful manner should
not be isolated from shareholder control by resort to the Commission's proxy
rules even though management is convinced that its current policy is morally
or politically correct.n
The court's holding with respect to reviewability could result in a more significant system of judicial review. While it might be argued that a district court
is better equipped to make factual findings than an appellate court, - certainly
direct appellate review of Commission determinations would provide a less expensive and less time-consuming remedy than a private action against the corporation. In addition, appellate review would be more in accord with congressional intent73 since it would provide a determination by Commission action
rather than by inaction or, alternatively, a private suit1 4
The effect of requiring the Commission to make a record suitable for review
is to request a declaratory order, which by statute is within the discretion of the
agency. 75 In addition, the extension of this requirement to all disputes concerning the inclusion of shareholder proposals would necessitate amendment of the
current rules, which provide for the proposal to be submitted to management 60
days prior to management's mailing the proxy materials in order to provide
time for the required hearings. 76 This factor coupled with the increased number
of shareholder proposals 7? could render the Commission incapable of performing
its function. The Supreme Court has already acknowledged the inability of the
71. "We think that there is a dear and compelling distinction between management's
legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of day-to-day business judgment,
and management's patently illegitimate claim of power to treat modem corporations with
their vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or moral predelictions. It could scarcely be argued that management is more qualified or more entitled to
make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders who are the true beneficial owners
of the corporation; and it seems equally implausible that an application of the proxy rules
which permitted such a result could be harmonized with the philosophy of corporate
democracy which Congress embodied in section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." Id.
72. Petition of Respondent Securities and Exchange Commission for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc 12, Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 Fad
659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. March 22, 1971) (No. 1162).
73. See S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
74. 432 F.2d at 672. However, direct review might be used to delay compliance as well
as to obtain a determination of the issues involved since, despite determination by a court
of appeals, Commission orders are enforced by proceedings in district courts. Securities
Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (Supp. V, 1970); 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1969).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1969). The corporation only needs to notify the Commission of its intention to exclude a proposal 30 days prior to its mailing of its proxy
solicitation. Id.
77. 2, 5 Loss 911, 2859 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) ; see N.Y. Times, June 13, 1970, at 41,
col. 6; id. at 45, col. 1.
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Commission to efficiently examine each proxy statement filed.78 This decision
can only aggravate the situation.
Finally, although in Medical Committee the court's discussion of the merits
was not determinative of the rights of the parties, since the case was remanded,
it does indicate that shareholders may propose that corporate assets should be
used in what they consider to be a socially useful manner. 7 This is merely
dictum, however, since the issue was whether or not this proposal, despite its
political overtones, affected the shareholders as beneficial owners of the corporation. 0 Moreover, while the decision ostensibly enhances prospects for shareholder democracy, the fact remains that the majority of shareholder proposals
usually receive little or no support from other shareholders, 8' while imposing
considerable cost on them.8 2 Thus the decision may have limited impact on the
ability of minority shareholders to effectuate implementation of their proposals.

Torts-Libel-Privilege of a Fair and True Report of Judicial Proceedings
Not a Defense When the Subject Matter of the Report Is a Matrimonial
Action.-Defendant newspaper chain published a series of articles based on
charges made by plaintiff's wife in an affidavit filed in the course of their separation proceeding. Plaintiff claimed that such publication gave rise to causes of
action in libel and invasion of privacy.' As an affirmative defense to both torts,
defendant pleaded the privilege of a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding
under section 74 of the New York Civil Rights Law. 2 The trial court denied
78. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); see SEC Securities Act Release No.
4944, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8496 (Jan. 15, 1969), [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff77,645.
79. 432 F.2d at 681; see S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) which would allow shareholder proposals of a political nature unless action was beyond the ability of the corporation.
80. 432 F.2d at 681.
81. E.g., General Motors included four shareholder proposals in the 1970 management
proxy. Three failed to receive 3% of the vote and the fourth failed to receive 6% of the vote.
Report of the 62nd General Motors Stockholders Meeting 6-10 (1970). See Emerson &
Latcham, the SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 807, 835
(1952).

82.

Chilgren, A Plea for Relief from Proxy Rule 14a-8, 19 Bus. Law. 303-05 (1963).

1. "In the libel causes of action, the plaintiff allege[d] that the articles were false and
defamatory and, in his invasion of privacy counts, that the articles were published 'for
advertising purposes and for purposes of trade and without [his] consent', in violation of
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law." Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 27 N.Y.2d 9, 12,
261 N.E.2d 251, 252, 313 N.Y.S.2d 104, 106 (1970); see N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1948).
2. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 74 (McKinney Supp. 1970) provides in part:
"A civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the
publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other
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plaintiff's motion to strike the defense and the appellate division affirmed,
certifying a question to the court of appeals concerning the propriety of its
determination.3 The New York Court of Appeals reversed in a 4-3 decision,
holding that since the statute was intended to protect the report of public proceedings, it had no application when the source of the objectionable matter was
a nonpublic matrimonial action. Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 27 N.Y.2d 9, 261
N.E.2d 251, 313 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1970).
The privilege of a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding has long been
recognized as an affirmative defense to libel in common law jurisdictions on both
sides of the Atlantic.4 At common law, it was necessary that the report be fair
and true to constitute a valid defense; thus by its own terms the privilege was
qualified 5 and was not allowed if the plaintiff could demonstrate that the report
was garbled,0 distorted, unfair, or an inaccurate version of the proceedings.7 In
addition, there existed the exception common to all such qualified privileges,
official proceeding, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of
the statement published."
3. Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 32 App. Div. 2d 744 (1st Dep't 1969) (mem.), re\d,
27 N.Y2d 9, 261 N.E.2d 251, 313 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1970).
4. The leading case on the subject is The King v. Wright, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396 (K.B.
1799). In that decision, the defendant was accused of criminal libel for publishing a defamatory committee report from the House of Commons. The court refused to allow the prosecution, holding that the publication of judicial proceedings "may be to the disadvantage of the
particular individual concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the public that the proceedings
of Courts of Justice should be universally known ....
The same reasons also apply to the
proceedings in Parliament ... ." Id. at 1399. See generally Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138, 150 (1904) ; Lesperance v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 31 Cal. Rptr.
873 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884); Park v. Detroit Free
Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888); Lee v. Brooklyn Union Publishing Co, 209
N.Y. 245, 103 N.E. 155 (1913); Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 84 Ohio St 408, 95 N.E.
917 (1911).
5. Robinson v. Johnson, 239 F. 671, 674 (8th Cir. 1917); Lee v. Brooklyn Union
Publishing Co., 209 N.Y. 245, 103 N.E. 155 (1913); Thomas v. Croswell, 7 Johns. 264 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct 1810). The Restatement of Torts § 611, at 293 (1938) defines the privilege as
follows:
"The publication of a report of judicial proceedings, or proceedings of a legislative or
administrative body or an executive officer of the United States, a State or Territory thereof,
or a municipal corporation or of a body empowered by law to perform a public duty is
privileged, although it contains matter which is false and defamatory, if it is
"(a) accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of such proceedings, and
"(b) not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed."
See also W. Prosser, Torts § 110, at 816 (3d ed. 1964); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1438 (1928). For
a thorough discussion of the history, application and shortcomings of the privilege, see
Barnett, The Privilege of Defamation by Private Report of Public Official Proceedings, 31
Ore. L. Rev. 185 (1952).
6. Thomas v. Croswell, 7 Johns. 264, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
7. Robinson v. Johnson, 239 F. 671, 674 (8th Cir. 1917); see W. Prosser, Torts § 110,
at 818-19 (3d ed. 1964).
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that a publication made with malicious intent would not be protected. 8 New
York's version of the privilege, section 74 of the Civil Rights Law," is basically
a codification of the common law rule.
Prior to 1956, section 337 of the Civil Practice Act, the predecessor to the
present statute, defined the privilege as extending to the "report of any judicial,
legislative or other public and official proceedings, 1 0 a designation which the
court of appeals in Danziger v. Hearst Corp." and the appellate division in

Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co. 12 interpreted to exclude reports of matrimonial
actions."Danzigerand Stevenson each concerned an action against a newspaper

8. Shapiro v. Health Ins. Plan, 7 N.Y.2d 56, 60, 163 N.E.2d 333, 336, 194 N.Y.S.2d 509,
513 (1959) ; Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 446, 121 N.E. 341, 343 (1918) ; see Saroyan
v. Burkett, 57 Cal. 2d 706, 371 P.2d 293, 21 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1962). Malice sufficient to defeat
a qualified privilege has been defined in New York as follows: "By actual malice Is meant
'personal spite or ill will, or culpable recklessness or negligence.'" Hoeppner v. Dunkirk
Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 106, 172 N.E. 139, 142 (1930), quoting Cherry v. Des Molnes
Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 300, 86 N.W. 323 (1901).

9. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 74 (McKinney Supp. 1970); see note 2 supra. Although the
only limitation expressly contained in section 74 is that the report be fair and true, the
recent case of Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 246 N.E.2d 333, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1969),
indicated that the common law malicious intent qualification is still recognized in Now York.
The Williams court held that when the sole purpose of the publication was to cause injury
to the plaintiff, the defense could not be invoked. Id. at 599, 246 N.E.2d at 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d
at 479. Therefore, the New York rule appears to be in accord with the common law view. See
Restatement of Torts, supra note S. In its original form, the New York statute actually
contained an express provision that malice would destroy the privilege. Law of April 1, 1854,
ch. 130, § 1, [1854] N.Y. Laws 77th Sess. 314 (repealed 1880). However, a 1930 amendment
deleted that portion of the statute. Law of Sept. 1, 1930, ch. 619, § 1, [1930) N.Y. Laws
153d Sess. 1127 (amended 1940). Nevertheless, the courts have interpreted the amendment
as having not been intended to allow the privilege for a malicious publication. For an analysis
of the statute and a discussion of the Williams case, see 38 Fordham L. Rev. 369 (1969).
Several states have enacted laws similar to the New York statute. See, e.g., Cal. Ctv. Code
§ 47(4) (West 1954); Ga. Code Ann. § 105-704 (1968); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
5432(1) (1958).
10. Law of April 17, 1940, ch. 561, § 5, [1940] N.Y. Laws 163d Sess. 1495 (emphasis
added). The law has existed under several titles since it was first passed in 1854. Law of
April 1, 1854, ch. 130, § 1, [1854] N.Y. Laws 77th Sess. 314. For a complete history of the
statute see I E. Seelman, The Law of Libel and Slander in the State of New York V 211,
at 261-64 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Seeliman].
11. 304 N.Y. 244, 107 N.E.2d 62 (1952), noted in 27 St. John's L. Rev. 153 (1952).
12. 276 App. Div. 614, 96 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't), aff'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y.
81, 96 N.E.2d 187 (1950), noted in 19 Fordham L. Rev. 334 (1950). Although Stevenson was
not a determination by the state's highest court, it is often cited In conjunction with the
Danziger decision on the subject of the report of matrimonial proceedings. E.g., Shiles v. News
Syndicate Co., 27 N.Y.2d 9, 14, 261 N.E.2d 251, 253, 313 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1970); Seelman,
supra note 10, ff 211, at 263; 1956 Bill Jacket Collection ch. 891, at 5. See note 47 infra.
This is apparently due to the fact that Stevenson contains a dearer and more thorough
discussion of the privilege.
13. 304 N.Y. at 248-49, 107 N.E.2d at 64-65; 276 App. Div. at 618, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56
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publisher which had printed the allegedly defamatory contents of an affidavit
filed by the plaintiff's wife during separation proceedings. 14 In each action, the
defendant invoked the privilege claiming that the affidavits were part of a
judicial proceeding and therefore any publication of their contents was protected
by the statute.' 5 Each court, however, ruled that the statute was inapplicable
when the source of the report was a matrimonial proceeding.10 Both opinions
reasoned that section 278 of the Rules of Civil Practice 7 (now section 235 of
the Domestic Relations Law' s ) prohibited the examination of court files in a
matrimonial action by anyone other than a party thereto, such an action wms
secret rather than "public" within the meaning of section 337 of the Civil Practice Act? 9 Therefore, since section 337 expressly privileged the report of "public"
proceedings only, the statute afforded no protection to the publication of a non20
public action between spouses.
The rationale behind construing the statute against the publisher was not,
however, based soley on the interpretation of the word "public." As indicated in
Stevenson, the main objective of the privilege was to protect "the public interest
in having proceedings of courts of justice public, not secret, for the greater
security thus given for the proper administration of justice."' Ordinarily, the
benefit derived from having open trials "more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings." 22 However, the legislature, by enacting the secrecy provisions of
section 278 of the Rules of Civil Practice, apparently decided that in divorce
and separation cases the balance of convenience ought to be in favor of the
14. 304 N.Y. at 246-47, 107 N.E,2d at 63; 276 App. Div. at 614-15, 96 N.Y.Sd at 752.
15. 304 N.Y. at 247, 107 N.E2.d at 63-64; 276 App. Div. at 615-16, 96 N.YS.2d at 753.
16. 304 N.Y. at 248-49, 107 N.E.2d at 64-65; 276 App. Div. at 618-19, 96 N.Y.S.2d at
755-56.
17. N.Y.R. Civ. Prac. 278, (19211 N.Y. Laws 144th Sess. 614.
18. N.Y. Dom. ReL Law § 235 (McKinney Supp. 1970), provides in part:
"An officer of the court with whom the proceedings in a matrimonial action or a written
agreement of separation or an action or proceeding for custody, visitation or maintenance of
a child are fied, or before whom the testimony is taken, or his clerk, either before or after
the termination of the suit, shall not permit a copy of any of the pleadings, affidavits, written
agreement of separation or memorandum thereof, or testimony, or any examination or perusal
thereof, to be taken by any other person than a party, or the attorney or counsel of a
party who had appeared in the cause, except by order of the court."
Other proceedings in which secrecy is maintained by statute include grand jury proceedings,
N.Y. Crim Proc. Law § 190.85(3) (McKinney 1970) (effective Sept. 1, 1971), and juvenile
prosecutions, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 720.15 (McKinney 1970) (effective Sept. 1, 1971).

19. 304 N.Y. at 249, 107 N.E2d at 65; 276 App. Div. at 617-18, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
20. 304 N.Y. at 249, 107 N.E.2d at 65; 276 App. Div. at 617-18, 96 N.YS.2d at 755.
21. 276 App. Div. at 615-16, 96 N.YS.2d at 753, quoting Lee v. Brooklyn Union Publishing Co., 209 N.Y. 245, 248, 103 N.E. 155, 156 (1913).
22. 276 App. Div. at 618, 96 N.YS.Zd at 755, quoting The King v. Wright, 101 Eng. Rep.
1396, 1399 (K.B. 1799).
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private litigant. 23 Thus, as viewed by the Stevenson court, the underlying

purpose
for which the privilege was devised did not obtain in matrimonial
24
suits.
The doctrine announced in the Danziger and Stevenson cases remained
firmly established for only a few years until an amendment to section 337 of
the Civil Practice Act was passed in 1956.25 The new version, which eventually
became section 74 of the Civil Rights Law, defined the privilege as extending
to the report of "any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official
proceeding." 26 Since the hitherto key word "public" was deleted, it became
questionable whether the doctrine still prevailed. In 1966, the judiciary interpreted the amendment in Keogh v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc.,27 where

plaintiff sought to recover for the publication of defamatory remarks gleaned
from the record of a grand jury hearing. 28 The plaintiff contended that grand
jury proceedings were protected from the public by statute in a manner similar
to matrimonial actions 20 and therefore the defense of a fair and true report of
judicial proceedings was inapplicable under the Danziger holding. 0 In denying
this contention, the trial court reasoned that since the validity of Danziger
turned on the presence of the word "public" in the statute, the removal of that
word, in effect, overruled that holding.8 1 Without specifically referring to the
legislative history of the amendment, the court expressed its view that it was
the clear intention of the legislature to have the privilege "apply to fair and

true reports of judicial and other
official proceedings, regardless of whether
82
they are public or nonpublic. 3
Notwithstanding this determination, the Shiles decision has proven any
apparent change in the law to be illusory. The thrust of Chief Judge Fuld's
majority opinion constituted a reiteration of the policy considerations under23. 276 App. Div. at 618, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
24. Id.
25. Law of April 20, 1956, ch. 891, § 1, (19561 N.Y. Laws 179th Sess. 1914.
26. Id. (emphasis deleted).
27. 51 Misc. 2d 888, 274 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 28 App. Div. 2d 1209,
285 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1st Dep't 1967), motion for leave to appeal denied, 21 N.Y.2d 959, 237
N.E.2d 235, 289 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1968).
28. Id. at 889, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
29. Id. at 891, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 305. Grand Jury proceedings are subject to the secrecy
provisions of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.85(3) (McKinney 1970) (effective Sept. 1, 1971).
30. 51 Misc. 2d at 891, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Keogh court's view was shared by Seelman, supra note 10, ff211, at 264.
Seelman likewise saw the purpose of the amendment to be the reversal of Danzlger and
Stevenson: "These amendments destroyed as authority all prior determinations involving
.. .the restriction on the right if the matter was official but not public." Id. It was Seelman's
opinion that this immunity amounted to a right rather than a privilege. Id. ff 209. He
therefore welcomed the amendment because it overcame what he termed the "absurd result"
reached in such decisions as Danziger and Stevenson concerning the nonpublic nature of
matrimonial actions. Id.
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lying Danziger and Stevenson. 3 By enacting section 235 of the Domestic
Relations Law, the Legislature, in the court's view, had manifested an intention that in matrimonial proceedings the individual's right to privacy should
prevail over the public's interest in scrutinizing the courts. 34 Were the privilege
extended to permit the unbridled publication of divorce hearings, the records

of such hearings could be "'used to gratify private spite or promote public
scandal' .....
,35 Moreover, the proposed expansion of the privilege would, in
the opinion of the court, afford one spouse the opportunity to force the other
to a settlement "by threatening ... publication of the charges and accusations
contained in the pleadings or affidavits filed in the matrimonial action."30
Therefore, the court reaffirmed the law as propounded by Danziger and
Stevenson, that "'such a publication is actionable if defamatory' . . . "
The court recognized that the authority of those cases had been called into

question by the intervening deletion of the word "public" from the statuteas
but rejected the notion that the Legislature had intended this amendment to
extend the privilege to all official proceedings, whether public or nonpublic.3 9
To support this contention, the court relied primarily on the memorandum
written by Governor Harriman in approving the amendment. After noting the
existence of numerous statutes in New York protecting the secrecy of various

actions such as matrimonial and grand jury proceedings, the Governor added:
"My approval of this bill cannot and should not be construed as a modification or weakening of the justifiable protections embodied in the laws mentioned.
Secrecy and other safeguards where provided by our laws continue to be in
33. 27 N.Y.2d at 14, 261 N.E.2d at 253, 313 N..2d at 107. Judges Burke, Bergan, and
Gibson concurred in Chief Judge Fuld's opinion.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 15, 261 N.E.2d at 253, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 107-0 (citation omitted), quoting
In re Caswell, 18 RJi 835, 836, 29 A. 259 (1893).
36. 27 N.Y.2d at 15, 261 N.E.2d at 253, 313 N.YS.2d at 108.
37. Id. (emphasis deleted), quoting Danziger v. Hearst Corp., 304 N.Y. 244, 248, 107
N.E.2d 62, 64 (1952). The majority also disallowed the privilege as a defense to the cause
of action for invasion of privacy: "It follows from what we have written-with respect to
an action for libel-that the statutory privilege of fair and true report of a judicial proceeding may not be invoked as a defense to invasion of privacy. Whether or not section 74,
captioned and entitled, as it is, 'Privileges in action for libel', would ever be available in an
action for invasion of privacy, the policy considerations underlying and embodied in section
235 of the Domestic Relations Law render section 74 unavailable in any suit based upon a
report of a matrimonial action in which the disclosure of information is forbidden except by
court order." 27 N.Y.2d at 18, 261 N.E.2d at 256, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 110-11 (emphasis deleted
& footnote omitted). The court also granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defense of
truth as it applied to the cause of action in invasion of privacy. The Chief Judge reasoned
that "Esince... injury may result even if the material published is entirely accurate, it follows that truth is irrelevant to a charge of invasion of privacy." Id. at 19, 261 N.E.2d at
256, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (footnote omitted).
38. 27 N.Y.2d at 15-16, 261 N.E2d at 254, 313 N.YS.2d at I08-09.
39. Id. at 16, 261 N.E.2d at 254, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
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effect and to be fully respected. '40 The court apparently reasoned that the
Governor could not have intended the bill to expand the privilege, because such
an expansion would remove the threat of tort liability, and thus a "weakening"
of the statutory secrecy provisions would inevitably result.41 However, in
regarding Governor Harriman's memorandum as the "only authoritative indication of the Legislature's design,"' 42 the majority disregarded the veto
message written by Governor Dewey which disapproved an identical bill four
48
years earlier for fear that it would, in effect, reverse the Stevenson decision.
Nevertheless, the court found no intention on the part of the Legislature to
extend the privilege to include all nonpublic trials. Rather, "[b]y deleting
the word, 'public,' the Legislature was merely extending the privilege to certain
quasi-judicial and nonjudicial proceedings-such as those conducted by administrative agencies-which are not generally considered to be 'public' .... 1,44
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Breitel expressed his view that the purpose of
the amendment was to extend the privilege to include the report of all pro40. 1956 N.Y. Legis. Annual 495; see 27 N.Y.2d at 17, 261 N.E.2d at 255, 313 N.Y.S.2d
at 109. The entire memorandum is reprinted in an appendix to the Shiles decision. Id. at 24,
261 N.E.2d at 259, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 115-16.
41. "[Slection 74 of the Civil Rights Law does not afford a party a license to destroy
by indirection the salutary protection afforded by section 235 of the Domestic Relations
Law." 27 N.Y.2d at 18, 261 N.E.2d at 255-56, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 110. judge Breltel Interpreted
the Harriman memorandum quite differently in his dissent. See text accompanying notes
48 & 49 infra.
42. Id. at 16, 261 N.E.2d at 254, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
43. 1952 N.Y. Legis. Annual 381-82. A copy of Governor Dewey's memorandum appears
in the Appendix to the Shiles decision. 27 N.Y.2d at 22-23, 261 N.E.2d at 258-59, 313
N.Y.S.2d at 114-15. The court cited Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301 N.Y. 346, 93 N.E.2d 884
(1950), to support its contention that Governor Harriman's memorandum was "the only
significant legislative history in this case." 27 N.Y.2d at 17, 261 N.E.2d at 255, 313 N.Y.S.2d
at 109. However, Teeval indicated that a governor performs a legislative function by vetoing
legislation as well as by approving it. 301 N.Y. at 362, 93 N.E.2d at 890. Therefore, according
to the Teeval reasoning, the Shiles court should have considered Governor Dewey's earlier
veto of an identical bill to be "significant" legislative history. "The governor's action in
approving or vetoing a bill constitutes a part of the legislative process, and therefore the
action of the governor upon a bill may be considered in determining legislative intent."
2 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 5004, at 488-89 (3d ed. 1943) (footnote
omitted).
44. 27 N.Y.2d at 17, 261 N.E.2d at 255, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 110. The only authority referred
to by the court in this regard was the case of Wiener v. Wientraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239
N.E.2d 540, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1968). There it was held that the privilege afforded by
section 74 of the Civil Rights Law applied to the report of a proceeding before the Grievance
Committee of the New York City Bar Association. Id. at 331-32, 239 N.E.2d at 540-41, 292
N.Y.S.2d at 668-69. However, the Wiener decision, although decided subsequent to the 1956
amendment, made no attempt to examine the legislative purpose behind the amendment.
Moreover, the Shiles court's failure to point to legislative history indicating that the amendment was designed to include only "quasi-judicial and nonjudicial proceedings" further
weakens its position.
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ceedings, regardless of their nonpublic nature. 45 In this regard, the minority
considered Governor Dewey's 1952 memorandum vetoing the earlier bill as a
valid indication of legislative intent.04 In addition, the dissent was influenced
by a compilation of legislative history, containing messages from diverse legal
authorities requesting that Governor Harriman veto the 1956 bill for the same
reason.47 Moreover, Judge Breitel, in disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of Governor Harriman's approval memorandum, pointed out that in
his memorandum Governor Harriman "did not disagree with what Governor
Dewey . . . had viewed as the effect of the earlier identical proposed legislation . ... ,,4 Nevertheless, Governor Harriman approved the bill with the
expectation that "the statutory secrecy surrounding selected judical [sic]
proceedings, would [of itself] prevent undesirable publication."4 9 According to
the minority, the fact that this expectation had not been fulfilled in no way
detracted from the "patent and uniformly consistent legislative history."50
Judge Breitel considered these documents persuasive but redundant "in the face
of the plain statutory language." 5' 1 The dissenting opinion concluded with the
implication that the majority had overstepped its judicial function: "The result, however unfortunate it5 2may be regarded, may not justify contradiction
of the legislative command.
Thus, in the absence of a clearer statement by the New York Legislature,
the application of the privilege of a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding remains virtually unchanged from the time of the Danziger and Stevenson
decisions, despite the 1956 amendment to the statute. The extension of the
privilege to include quasi-judicial and nonjudicial hearings appears to be the
only result of the amendment. Presumably, the publication of a record from
any of the proceedings in which secrecy is statutorily maintained,5 3 will remain
actionable if defamatory. The fact that Governor Harriman's memorandum
and the Danziger case both made reference to secrecy provisions other than
those governing matrimonial actions, 54 indicates that the court may apply
similar rules to other nonpublic proceedings. Although exception might be
45. 27 N.Y.2d at 20, 261 N.E.2d at 257, 313 N.Y..2d at 112. Judges Scilepp! and Jasen
concurred in Judge Breitel's dissenting opinion.
46.

Id.; see 1952 N.Y. Legis. Annual 381.

47. 27 N.Y.2d at 20, 261 N.E.2d at 257, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 112. These messages are compiled
in a bill jacket collection available at the New York State Library in Albany. 1956 Bill
Jacket Collection ch. 891. Among the memoranda in the compilation are those of the
Attorney General, id. at 14, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, id. at 5,
and the Executive Secretary and Director of Research of the Law Revision Commission,
id. at 8.
48. 27 N.Y.2d at 20, 261 N.E.2d at 256-57, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
49. Id., 261 N.E.2d at 257, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 112 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 22, 261 N.E.2d at 258, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53.

See note 18 supra.

54. 304 N.Y. at 249, 107 N.E.2d at 65; 1956 Legis. Annual 494-95.
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taken to the court's reasoning in reaching its conclusion," it is difficult to
fault the public policy that motivated it. Society would have obtained little
benefit from the increase in scandalous news stories and injured reputations
which would have inevitably followed an expansion of the privilege.
55.

See notes 43 & 44 supra.

